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INTRODUCTION
The allowance of many personal deductions, such as the deduction for
medical expenses or charitable contributions, has been criticized on the
contention that such deductions are not appropriate elements of an income tax
system, but rather are merely devices by which Congress has expended federal
funds to further some nontax program or other goal. The tax revenues that are
not collected because of these provisions have been characterized as
"subsidies" or as camouflaged direct expenditures of the government. This
view has attained such prominence that Congress requires the federal
government to publish annually a "budget" that lists those tax provisions that
the issuing department concludes are so-called "tax expenditures." The
premise of these tax expenditure budgets is that the provisions listed in them
do not implement the principles thatjustify using income measurement as the
basis for allocating the federal tax burden among the populace. This view
rests on a notion that there are immutable principles that underlie the adoption
of an income tax system and that some agreement can be reached as to the
identification of those principles. The adoption of the tax expenditure concept
has had enormous effect on the inclusion and deletion of provisions in the tax
law.
This article examines four personal deductions that have been
characterized in the publication of "budgets" by several government agencies
as tax expenditures, and therefore as not conforming to income tax principles.
The four deduction are: medical expenses, theft and casualty losses, charitable
contributions, and the interest deduction for mortgages on a personal
residence. The thesis of this article is that all of those deductions, in fact, do
conform to progressive income tax principles and therefore cannot properly
by characterized as governmental expenditures. In other words, each of those
deductions performs a useful task in the proper measurement of income for tax
allocation purposes when the entire structure of the income tax and the
principles that underlie it are taken into account.
Personal Deductions
While the determination of whether the deductions discussed in this
article are expenditures is not conclusive of the issue of their survival in the
tax law, it can have a significant impact on their survival or on the terms on
which they might survive. Moreover, the validity and usefulness of the entire
tax expenditure concept is open to question, and a demonstration that a
number of items have been wrongly identified as expenditures by the
government agencies that list those items weakens whatever confidence one
might otherwise still have in the concept.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Meaning and Criticisms of "Personal Deductions"
Subject to limitations, the Internal Revenue Code' allows individual
taxpayer deductions for certain nonbusiness and noninvestment expenditures
and losses. These deductions are commonly referred to as "personal
deductions." Examples of personal deductions include the deductions for
medical expenses,2 theft and casualty losses,3 certain state and local taxes,4
alimony payments,' charitable contributions,6 and qualified residence interest.7
Critics of personal deductions8 contend that the deductions do not implement
the goals and purposes of a progressive income tax system, 9 but rather are
employed as a device to subsidize taxpayers for programmatic purposes. The
critics maintain that, as a result, these deductions will erode the tax base,
1. The Internal Revenue Code (Code or I.R.C.) refers to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended.
2. See I.R.C. § 213 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
3. See I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (1994).
4. See I.R.C. § 164(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
5. See I.R.C. § 215 (1994).
6. See I.R.C. § 170 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
7. See I.R.C. § 163 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
8. See, e.g., Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly
in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L.
REv. 831 (1979); Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local
Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REv. 413 (1996).
There are critics of the income tax who urge adoption of a different type of tax system,
such as a consumption tax. For a succinct summary of the various proposals, see Lawrence
Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious Link Between Rate and Base, 2 CHAP. L.
REv. 197 (1999). In that article, Professor Zelenak describes the several substitute tax systems
that have been proposed. See id. at 200-03. In the proposed substitute systems, there would be
few or no personal deductions.
9. See infra Part I.B for definitions of the terms "progressive income tax system" and
"graduated rate system."
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reduce progressivity, and contravene the principles of horizontal and vertical
equity.' °
The classification of a personal deduction in such manner places a heavy
burden on those who advocate its retention to demonstrate that there are
compelling reasons to obtain the objective at which the deduction is aimed,
and that the tax system is the optimum vehicle for implementing that
objective. The latter requirement is especially onerous because the
employment of a deduction as a means of channeling dollars for a
programmatic function favors high-bracket taxpayers and provides no benefit
to those persons who have no tax liability or, in the case of itemized
deductions, to those who do not itemize their deductions." Under a graduated
tax rate structure, 12 a deduction has a greater dollar value to a high-income
taxpayer because that taxpayer is subject to a higher marginal tax rate. For
example, assume A earns $5000 and B earns $10,000. The tax regime to
which A and B are subject is structured so that the first $5000 of income is
taxed at a 10% rate and all other income is taxed at a 20% rate. A and B each
have a personal deduction of $100. Without the deduction, A's tax would be
$500. The deduction lowers A's taxes by $10. Without the deduction, B's
taxes would be $1500, but the deduction reduces B's tax by $20. The
deduction is worth twice as many dollars to B as it is to A.' 3
The extent to which personal deductions are characterized as aberrations
unsupported by the principles of income taxation is illustrated by the inclusion
10. Horizontal equity requires that persons in like income positions pay the same
amount of tax. Vertical equity requires that persons in dissimilar income positions pay
appropriately dissimilar taxes. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAuL R. MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES 72 (1985) ("Not only are the tax expenditure provisions the primary cause of
perceived tax inequity, but it also seems safe to say that they fail to achieve what most
Americans would perceive to be a fair distribution of funds."). Professors Surrey and McDaniel
also argue that since tax expenditures are not needed "to implement a normative tax on net
income ... they add unrelated complexity to the code." Id. at 91.
11. Itemized deductions are available only to those taxpayers who do not utilize the
standard deduction. See I.R.C. § 63 (1994).
12. See infra Part I.B for an explanation of a graduated tax rate schedule.
13. Personal deductions also favor the wealthy because most, e.g., the deduction for
state and local taxes, are itemized deductions and thus are of no use to those who utilize the
standard deduction. Since most low income taxpayers use the standard deduction, the personal
deductions are of no value to them. See Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions
in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 352-53 (1989). In his article, Professor Griffith
notes, however, that there are alternative ways to test progressivity. See id. at 355-60. For
example, in the A and B hypothetical described in the text, if no personal deduction was
provided in the tax system, then B would pay three times as much in taxes as A. However, under
a tax system that allows a personal deduction, B would pay 3.02 times the taxes paid by A. See
id. at 355-56.
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of many personal deductions in various tax expenditure budgets. 4 Several
governmental entities promulgate so-called tax expenditure budgets, each of
which states the estimated revenue that is lost due to the existence of
designated "nonneutral" tax provisions and characterizes those revenue
"losses" as government expenditures. Tax provisions which are deemed to
conform to the principles of taxation are sometimes called "neutral"
provisions." All others are termed "nonneutral," and the failure to collect the
revenue that would have been collected if the nonneutral provision had not
been adopted is characterized as equivalent to collecting that revenue and then
distributing it directly to the selected persons. 6 If a nonneutral provision
causes a significant reduction of the government's revenue, it may be listed
as a "tax expenditure." As already mentioned, many personal deductions are
so listed.
For example, in the Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2002, the list of tax expenditures includes the deductibility of medical
expenses, charitable contributions, casualty and theft losses, state and local
taxes on nonbusiness income or property, and interest on mortgages on a
personal residence."'
14. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2001-2005 (Comm. Print 2001), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/joint/hjoint01cp]02.html [hereinafter JCT TAX
EXPENDITURES]. The first tax expenditure budget was issued in fiscal year 1968. Stanley
Surrey advocated the use of the budget and advanced the theory behind it when he was Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy and in books and articles after he rejoined the faculty
at Harvard Law School. See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE
CONCERT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973); SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 10; Stanley S.
Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax
Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1970).
15. The word "neutrality" is sometimes used in a tax context to denote a tax provision
that will not alter market behavior. See e.g., John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax,
Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of
Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095,2135-36 (2000) (noting the argument put forth
by consumption tax advocates that a consumption tax is more tax "neutral" with respect to the
consumption versus savings decision). In this article, the terms "neutrality" and "nonneutrality"
refer to whether the tax provision does or does not conform to the principles of income taxation.
This is the manner in which the terms are used in the tax expenditure budgets.
16. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 10, at 25 ("According to the tax expenditure
concept, the beneficiary of a tax expenditure has paid the tax due under the normative structure,
absent the tax expenditures, and then is paid the amount of the tax reduction effected by the
special tax provisions... ").
17. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2002, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 61-76 (2001), available at,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget [hereinafter OMB BUDGET 2002]. The alimony
payment deduction of I.R.C. § 215 is not listed in the tax expenditure budgets. The deduction
2002]
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B. Thesis of the Article
It is important, at the very outset of this article, to state its thesis and its
contributions to the resolution of the issues discussed herein. To avoid
confusion, it is also important to expressly disclaim certain positions that are
not asserted herein.
As explained in Part I.C below, the tax expenditure concept rests on the
notion that there is an ideal structure for an income tax system which
conforms to principles on which the income tax system is based. While there
is controversy as to whether an ideal structure for the income tax exists and,
if so, as to the identity of the principles on which it rests," this article does not
directly address either of those issues. Instead, this article addresses the
question of whether, assuming arguendo that the tax expenditure concept is
correct in dividing tax items into neutral and nonneutral categories, certain
personal deductions have been improperly classified as nonneutral and
therefore as tax expenditures. This article contends that several of the
personal deductions listed in the tax expenditure budgets have been wrongly
classified as tax expenditures and therefore should be removed from the lists
and not subject to the taint that goes with that classification.
The neutrality of several of the personal deductions on which this article
focuses has been examined in several earlier articles. The two most
significant of those writings are the article defending the neutrality of the
and the resulting income to the payee, I.R.C. § 71, constitute an income-splitting scheme so that
income is divided between two taxpayers. See I.R.C. § 71 (1994). The alimony payment
deduction may be a desirable provision to provide relief for the financial burden of a taxpayer
who is maintaining the cost of two households. Indeed, some such taxpayers may be
maintaining the costs of multiple households. Providing relief can be viewed as serving a
programmatic function. One should note that alimony income is not excluded from taxation;
rather the deduction merely changes the identity of the person who is taxed on that income.
However, it is far from clear why that fact is sufficient to exclude the deduction from the tax
expenditure budget. If one subscribes to the tax expenditure viewpoint, at the very least, some
amount should be included in the tax expenditure budget, since the income is likely being
shifted to a taxpayer with lower marginal tax rates. One possible justification is that the alimony
deduction scheme provides a benefit to divorced parties similar to that enjoyed by married
couples, and thus moves towards equalizing their tax positions. The manner in which "tax
expenditures" are determined, and the requirement that the government promulgate tax
expenditure budgets, are briefly described in Part I.C.
18. See. e.g., Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A
Critical View, 54 TAx NOTEs 1661 (1992); Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax
Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969); Boris I. Bittker, The Tax
Expenditure Budget -A Reply to Professors Surrey & Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 538 (1969);
Stanley S. Surrey & William F. Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget - A Response to
Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528 (1969).
[Vol. 1: 1
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medical and charitable deduction written by Professor Andrews in 1972, " and
the critical response from Professor Kelman in 1979.2" Parts V.A. 1 and V.C. 1
of this article summarize Andrews' positions on medical and charitable
deductions respectively, and Parts V.A.3 and V.C.2 set forth a response to the
contentions that Professor Kelman made concerning those deductions. While
not disagreeing with the points made by Professor Andrews, this article
presents an independent and entirely different reason for classifying those two
deductions as neutral. The exposition and analysis of that independent
justification is the principal contribution of this article.
The income tax system in this country has utilized a progressive tax
structure for taxing individuals since it was adopted in 1913,2 although the
degree of progressivity has varied greatly over the years. A progressive
income tax structure is a system in which the greater the taxpayer's income,
the greater the percentage of that income that is required to be paid to the
government as an income tax. Under such a structure, the income taxes
payable by individuals with greater incomes will be a larger percentage of
their income than the taxes payable by individuals with less income.
The principal device for creating a progressive income tax system is to
have a tax rate schedule that employs graduated rates. A graduated rate2
system is a system in which, as a taxpayer's amount of taxable income
increases, the tax rate that is applied to an additional dollar of taxable income
is increased. For example, take a graduated rate system in which the first
$5000 of taxable income is taxed at a 10% rate, the next $10,000 of taxable
income is taxed at a 20% rate, and the taxable income in excess of $15,000 is
taxed at a 30% rate. IfA has taxable income of $5200, $5000 will be taxed at
a 10% rate ($500 of tax) and $200 will be taxed at a 20% rate ($40 of tax). As
a result, A's total tax bill will come to $540. If B has taxable income of
$18,000, $5000 will be taxed at a 10% rate ($500 of tax), $10,000 will be
taxed at a 20% rate ($2,000 of tax), and $3000 will be taxed at a 30% rate
($900 of tax). B's total tax will be $3400. The result is that A pays income
tax consisting of approximately 10.4% of her income while B pays income tax
consisting of approximately 18.9% of her income.23
19. See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv.
L. REv. 309 (1972).
20. See Kelman, supra note 8.
21. See Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166-67 (1915). The Underwood-Simmons
Tariff Act of 1913 established a rate of 1% on both individual and corporate income above what
was then a high exemption amount, $3000 in the case of single individuals. See id. at 166. The
tax also had a graduated surchage for incomes above $20,000. See id.
22. In this article, the terms "graduated rates" and "progressive rates" are sometimes
used interchangeably.
23. Note that graduated rates are applied to brackets of income. One of the most
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The tax expenditure budgets that have been promulgated reflect the view
that applying a progressive rate structure to individuals is a normal part of our
tax system. None of the tax expenditure budgets include in their lists of tax
expenditures the lower tax rates that are applied to individuals, i.e., the tax
expenditure budgets do not consider an ideal tax system to be one that
employs a flat rate in which event the lower rate of a graduated tax schedule
would be nonneutral. Indeed, the budget that is promulgated by the Joint
Committee on Taxation lists the lower income tax rates on corporations as a
nonneutral item, and expressly contrasts lower corporate income tax rates with
individual lower rates, which the Joint Committee on Taxation considers to
be neutral.24 The Joint Committee on Taxation states:
The corporate income tax includes a graduated tax rate schedule. The lower tax rates
in the schedule are classified by the Joint Committee staff as a tax
expenditure.., because they are intended to provide tax benefits to small business
and, unlike the graduated individual income tax rates, are unrelated to concerns about
ability of individuals to pay taxes.
25
The contrast could not be more striking.
Since a progressive rate structure constitutes an integral and normal part
of our income tax system as applied to individuals, a characterization of
specific tax provisions as neutral or nonneutral must take into account the
principles on which the adoption of a progressive rate structure is grounded,
along with the principles for using income as the taxable base. Because
progressive rates are neutral, tax provisions that serve to further the purposes
and ideals of progressivity must perforce be neutral as well. In other words,
a provision that implements the progressive tax rate system is no less neutral
than a provision that implements the system of taxing income, as contrasted
to taxing consumption or wealth. There have been several writings on the
question of the theoretical justification for progressive rates. In Part III of this
article, the alternative justifications that have been proposed are summarized
and their relative strengths evaluated.
This article maintains, and will subsequently demonstrate, that certain
personal deductions serve to implement the goals of progressivity and so are
elements of the income tax system itself rather than subsidies or incentives for
some nontax purpose. Consequently, those deductions cannot properly be
classified as nonneutral as that concept is used in the tax expenditure budgets.
common misconceptions of the tax rate structure is that once you earn enough income to move
up a bracket, all the earned income is taxed at that topmost rate. For example, in the A and B
hypothetical, some would believe that all of B's income would be taxed at 30%.
24. See JCT TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 14, at 24.
25. Id. at 7.
[Vol. 1: 1
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It is important to note just what significance the characterization of
neutrality has and what it does not. If a provision is deemed neutral, it does
not necessarily follow that it should be retained in the Code. The fact that a
provision is consistent with tax principles is not a reason to adopt or retain it;
however, the fact that a provision is inconsistent with tax principles is a factor
favoring its removal or rejection. The retention, deletion or modification of
a tax provision should rest on value judgments regarding a wide range of
considerations, e.g., economic, social, and political concerns. The
significance of a provision's being labeled nonneutral is that it places a
heavier burden of persuasion on those who would retain the provision in the
Code than otherwise would be the case. On the other hand, if a provision is
deemed to be neutral, it does not affect the burden of persuasion of those who
seek to repeal or to retain the provision. A neutral classification removes the
question of nonneutrality from the scales and leaves the question of retention
exclusively to a weighing of the various values that the provision either
supports or hinders, unencumbered by consideration of the extent to which the
provision fits within an ideal income tax.
Part IV of the article explains the role that personal and dependency
exemptions and the additional standard deduction have in implementing the
principles that underlie a progressive rate structure. Understanding the role
ofthese provisions helps to illuminate the roles that the medical and charitable
deductions have, as discussed in Part V.A and V.C of this article, and supports
the thesis of this article.
In addition to the article's discussion of the neutrality of the medical and
charitable deduction, Part V.B of the article contends that the deduction for
casualty and theft losses is a neutral provision. Unlike the contentions set
forth with regard to the medical and charitable deductions, the neutrality of the
casualty and theft loss deduction rests primarily on a consideration of the
principles of taxing income rather than the special principles for progressive
rates. However, as we shall see, the principles underlying progressivity add
support to that contention.
Finally, in Part V.D, the case for treating the deduction for qualified
residence interest as neutral is examined. While a case for neutrality can be
made on the ground that the provision mitigates an economic bias, it is more
tenuous than the arguments made in support of the other provisions examined
herein.
C. The Determination and Significance of Tax Expenditure Budgets
Professor Stanley Surrey, the father of the tax expenditure concept, was
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for tax policy during the Kennedy
administration. Surrey believed that a number of provisions of the tax code
2002]
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constituted a disguised form of government spending. However, since those
provisions were hidden in the forest of a complicated tax structure, consisting
of a vast number of provisions, they did not receive the same type of attention
and scrutiny that direct expenditures received. Thus, Surrey believed
politicians used the tax code as a vehicle to subsidize programs that perhaps
would not be feasible if proposed as direct outlays.
In order to bring attention to those types of subsidies, Surrey campaigned
for a requirement that Treasury publish a list of what he called "tax
expenditures." The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974 now requires the administration to report annually on tax expenditures
in its budget.26 The law also requires that estimates of tax expenditures be
published with all bills reported by congressional committees.27
In its recent release of the federal tax expenditures estimates, the Joint
Committee on Taxation stated:
"Tax expenditures" are defined under the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 ("the Budget Act") as "revenue losses attributable
to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of
tax, or a deferral of tax liability." Thus, tax expenditures include any reductions in
income tax liabilities that result from special tax provisions or regulations that provide
tax benefits to particular taxpayers.
Special income tax provisions are referred to as tax expenditures because they
may be considered to be analogous to direct outlay programs, and the two can be
considered as alternative means of accomplishing similar budget policy objectives.
28
The tax expenditure concept rests on the notion that there is a "normal"
or "ideal" income tax, that provisions which conform to that ideal tax are
neutral, and that the revenue lost from those that do not are governmental
expenditures. In other words, proponents of the tax expenditure concept argue
that the loss of revenue attributable to nonneutral provisions is a direct
expenditure that is made through the tax system and is camouflaged as an
element of the mechanism used to determine the proper amount of a person's
tax burden.
Professors Surrey and McDaniel explain it as follows:
The tax expenditure concept posits that an income tax is composed of two distinct
elements. The first element consists of structural provisions necessary to implement
26. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1976) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 622 (2001)).
27. See id.; see also Bruce Bartlett, The End of Tax Expenditures as We Know Them?,
92 TAX NOTES 413, 414 (2001); Jonathan Barry Forman, Origins of the Tax Expenditure
Budget, 30 TAX NOTES 537 (1986).
28. JCT TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 14, at 2 (quoting Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, § 3(3)).
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a normal income tax .... The second element consists of the special preferences
found in every income tax. These provisions, often called tax incentives or tax
subsidies, are departures from the normal tax structure and are designed to favor a
particular industry, activity, or class of persons.
29
The identification of nonneutral provisions (i.e., tax expenditures)
requires the determination of a "baseline" that comprises the ideal tax. There
are several governmental tax expenditure lists or budgets. While there is
overlap among those budgets, they are not identical because they employ
different baselines. For example, the staff of the Congressional Joint
Committee on Taxation utilizes a "normal income tax" baseline;3 o while the
Treasury uses the "reference tax law" baseline.3 Under the normal income
tax baseline, the Joint Committee's staff makes a determination as to which
tax provisions lie within "normal" comprehensive income tax law and which
do not. If a provision does not lie within what the staff considers to be the
normal tax law, and if it causes a reduction in revenue collection of sufficient
magnitude, the provision is listed as a tax expenditure.32 On the other hand,
as explained in greater detail below, Treasury's reference tax law baseline
relies on the subjective purpose that Congress had in adopting a provision, and
its list of tax expenditures are limited to "special exceptions in the tax code
that serve programmatic functions."3
There is far more at stake than semantics in choosing among the various
baselines that are employed in tax expenditure lists. The several baselines
reflect very different standards for classifying provisions as neutral or
nonneutral. One approach, the reference tax law baseline, is to classify a
provision as a tax expenditure if the classifying agency determines that the
Congressional purpose for adopting that provision was to carry out some
program that Congress wished to support. Under that approach, it does not
29. SURREY & McDANIEL, supra note 10, at 3.
30. JCT TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 14, at 2, 9-10; see also OMB BUDGET 2002,
supra note 17, at 76.
31. See OMB BUDGET 2002, supra note 17, at 76.
32. See JCT TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 14, at 2.
33. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2001, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 123 (2000) [hereinafter OMB
BUDGET 2001 ]. As discussed in more detail in the Conclusion of the article, in its most recent
budget, the Bush Administration has questioned the value of the tax expenditure budget. The
Bush budget refers to "so-called" tax expenditures and states "that the concept of 'tax
expenditure' is of questionable analytic value." OMB BUDGET 2002, supra note 17, at 61; see
also Heidi Glenn, Bush Administration Questions Value of Tax Expenditures List, 91 TAX
NOTES 535 (2001). The 2002 budget also removed the tax expenditure budget language quoted
in the text with regard to how Treasury determines tax expenditures, but stated that the budget
was determined by using the same standard that was applied in previous budgets.
2002]
Law Review
appear to matter whether the provision actually serves one or more of the
principles of the income tax system. The test is a subjective one, turning on
the purpose that Congress is deemed to have had for adopting the provision.
The other approach, the normal income tax baseline, attempts to apply a
more objective standard. Under that approach, the classification of provisions
as tax expenditures is made by determining whether a provision actually
serves one or more principles of the income tax system, regardless of the
purpose that Congress had for adopting the provision. In this article, the
objective approach of the normal income tax baseline is adopted. If one
accepts the tax expenditure concept, the standard should be whether the
provision does or does not fit within a "pure" income tax system, regardless
of whether the legislature's motives for adopting the provision were equally
as pure. If a useful and appropriate provision was adopted for a programmatic
reason, it still should be considered a neutral provision. 4 Consequently, there
is no speculation in this article as to what purposes Congress may have had in
adopting the tax provisions discussed herein.
Even for those who adhere to the tax expenditure concept, the listing of
a provision as a tax expenditure does not necessarily mean that it should be
repealed. a5 Professors Surrey and McDaniel themselves stated that having a
Code provision classified as a tax expenditure does not require its repeal.36
Such classification does mean, however, that the proponents of retaining that
provision have a heavy burden not only to demonstrate that the provision
serves a desirable purpose but also to show that it is the optimum device to
implement that purpose.
34. Query whether the reverse is true, that is, should a provision be considered
nonneutral if Congress mistakenly believed that the provision would act in a neutral manner and
that was the purpose of adopting the provision? This article does not address that issue as the
article focuses solely on the neutrality of an item that promotes tax principles.
35. In its report, the Joint Committee on Taxation claims, "[tihe Joint Committee staff
emphasizes, however, that in the process of listing tax expenditures, no judgment is made, nor
any implication intended, about the desirability of any special tax provision as a matter of public
policy." JCT TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 14, at 2-3.
36. See SURREY & McDANIEL, supra note 10, at 5 ("The classification of an item as a
tax expenditure does not in itself make that item either a desirable or an undesirable provision;
nor does it indicate whether the inclusion of the item in the tax system is good or bad fiscal
policy."). But compare Surrey's statement that "most tax incentives have decidedly adverse
effects on [horizontal and vertical] equity as between taxpayers." SURREY, supra note 14, at
136; see also Bartlett, supra note 27, at 414 ("Surrey clearly intended the term 'tax expenditure'
to be pejorative, undermining political support for tax preferences."); Victor Thuronyi, Tax
Expenditures: A Reassessment, 37 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1155 (1988) ("Surrey hoped that if
policymakers acknowledged that tax expenditures were spending programs, many would be
repealed as an ineffective means of providing a federal subsidy.") (citing SURREY, supra note
14, at 179-80).
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Adherence to the tax expenditure concept shifts the nature of the debate
over the question of whether a particular provision should be retained or
repealed to focus more on the role of the provision within a hypothetical ideal
tax system than on the extent to which the provision promotes a desirable
social or economic goal.37 The tax expenditure budgets have had great
influence on the legislative process."
D. Application of the Tax Expenditure Concept to Personal Deductions
The tax expenditure concept has both proponents and critics.39 The tax
expenditure concept itself is not under review in this article, albeit the thesis
of this article does cast a shadow over the efficacy of that concept. The focus
of this piece is to demonstrate that, even given a tax expenditure approach,
many of the personal deductions that typically are listed as tax expenditures
implement principles that underlie a progressive income tax, and therefore
should not be classified as expenditures. Acceptance of that thesis, however,
does not require that those deductions be retained in the Code. There are
many provisions that could be included in the tax law in furtherance of the
principles of taxation, but which could be properly omitted from the tax law
if there are policy reasons for doing so or if those principles could be better
served by using a different approach. The point is merely that many of the
personal deductions currently labeled as tax expenditures cannot be repudiated
on the basis that they do not serve tax principles. If they are to be repudiated,
it must be for some reason other than that they are outside of a neutral or ideal
tax structure.
When discussing the question of whether personal deductions fit within
an ideal income tax system, the same issue arises in connection with the
allowance of certain statutory exclusions from income and with the allowance
of certain tax credits. This article does not address tax credits at all, and deals
37. See Thuronyi, supra note 36, at 1181 ("[Under Surrey's conceptj provisions
identified as tax expenditures become virtually indefensible. Classification of a particular
provision therefore becomes critical .... ").
38. See id. at 1170-81 (also noting the indications that Congress has not taken the
concept "fully to heart."); see also Joseph A. Minarik, How Tax Reform Came About, 37 TAX
NOTEs 1359, 1361 (1987).
[Surrey] likened the tax savings from a preference for a particular purpose, say
encouraging business investment, to a government outlay for the same purpose. Thus
was coined the term, "tax expenditures." This concept was institutionalized on an
illustrative basis in the Federal budget in the mid-1960s, and has had a powerful
influence on virtually all deliberations on the Federal income tax ever since.
Id.
39. See supra note 18 for examples of such proponents and critics.
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with only one of the exclusion provisions, the exclusion of certain medical
expense reimbursements. The focus of this article is on the role of personal
deductions in an income tax system. However, the roles that personal and
dependency exemptions and the additional standard deduction for the aged
and blind play in the income tax system are discussed.
A number of commentators have offered various reasons for concluding
that some of the personal deductions are consistent with the purposes of an
income tax system and therefore do not constitute departures from normal tax
treatment, but other commentators have rejected those arguments." This
article will revisit and weigh the merits of some of those discussions and will
examine some of the personal deductions to determine whether there are
previously uncharted grounds thatjustify treating them as implementations of
the principles that underlie progressive income taxation.
E. Progressivity
As previously noted, the tax system currently employed in the United
States, which has been employed since the modem income tax was first
adopted in 1913, is one which utilizes a progressive rate structure- that is, the
greater the amount of one's income, the larger the percentage of that income
that is payable as a tax. Also, as previously noted, even the promulgators of
tax expenditure budgets treat progressive rates for individuals as a normal part
of the tax law.4' The decision to use a progressive rate structure rests on
principles that are separate from those that underlie the decision to tax income
rather than taxing something else, such as consumption. In light of the current
and historical linkage of progressivity to the taxation of income, the principles
supporting the adoption of a progressive rate system must be taken into
account in determining whether a deduction is a neutral provision to the same
extent that the principles supporting the taxation of income must be taken into
account.
Before examining specific personal deductions, it will be useful to
explore the principles that commentators have concluded underlie progressive
income taxation.4" One of the difficulties encountered in seeking to
characterize tax provisions as neutral or nonneutral is that there is not
40. See Andrews, supra note 19; Griffith, supra note 13; Kaplow, supra note 8; Kelman,
supra note 8; William J. Turnier, Evaluating Personal Deductions in an Income Tax - The
Ideal, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 262 (1981) [hereinafter Tumier, Evaluating Personal Deductions];
William J. Turnier, Personal Deductions and Tax Reform: The High Road and the Low Road,
31 VILL. L. REV. 1703 (1986) [hereinafter Turnier, Personal Deductions and Tax Reform].
41. See supra text accompanying note 24.
42. You will recall that progressivity is implemented by employing graduated tax rates.
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universal agreement as to the principles that support income taxation and
those that support the imposition of graduated tax rates. It is necessary
therefore to set forth the premises on which the analysis in this article is
grounded. Also, it is useful to examine the role that the personal and
dependency exemptions serve in the progressive system, because
understanding the role of those provisions helps to illuminate the contention
that personal deductions are neutral.
HI. THE DEFINITION OF INCOME
The most commonly quoted definition of income is the so-called Haig-
Simons definition: a person's income equals the amount of increase in wealth
accumulated by that person during a specified period, typically one year, plus
the market value of the person's personal consumption during that period.43
But taxation is a practical matter, and the abstract model set forth in the Haig-
Simons definition must be modified to accommodate other goals and
considerations. For example, administrative convenience and the adverse
effect that the imposition of taxes may have on behavior and investment must
be taken into account. Nevertheless, the Haig-Simons definition is often cited
as a starting point for determining the "ideal" tax.
The Haig-Simons definition rests on the notion that the costs of
government should be apportioned among those persons who use societal
goods which thereby become unavailable to other members of the public. The
accumulation of wealth is taxed because it represents the power to consume
at future dates. In effect then, the income tax is a tax on personal consumption
and on the present value of future personal consumption.
43. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOMETAXATION 50 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1980)
(1938) ("Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of(1) the market value of rights
exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between
the beginning and end of the period in question."). While the Haig-Simons definition is a useful
starting point, no one contends that it accurately describes the United States tax system - for
example, our current system has a realization concept and does not tax imputed income. See
e.g., John S. Nolan, The Merit of an Income Tax Versus a Consumption Tax, 12 AM. J. TAX
POL'Y 207, 210 (1995). Thuronyi observed:
Surrey had no desire to entangle his tax expenditure concept in disputes over the
interpretation of Haig-Simons income. Moreover, he intended the list of tax
expenditures to serve at least in part as a realistic "hit list" for reform. Identifying all
departures from the Haig-Simons definition as tax expenditures would have been
overbroad and ineffective, implicitly advocating reforms that would be
administratively infeasible or politically untenable.
Thuronyi, supra note 36, at 1165 (citations omitted).
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But there is a question as to what constitutes personal consumption. For
example, should a person be taxed on the consumption of goods only when
they are used for the private benefit of that person? Does the consumption of
goods that benefits a large segment of society (as contrasted to the private
benefit of the consumer) fit within the concept of "personal consumption"?
For example, Professor Andrews argues that charitable contributions should
not be treated as personal consumption because they benefit a larger group
than the person making the contribution." Professor Kelman, while not
disputing the principle on which Professor Andrews' argument rests, contends
that the contributor obtains extensive private benefits from a charitable
contribution and should not escape taxation merely because there is a public
benefit as well.45 We will return to this issue when the charitable deduction
is examined later in this article.46
III. THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
Progressive taxation, as implemented by a graduated rate schedule, has
been incorporated into federal income tax law since the passage of the first
Revenue Act in 1913, after the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted.47
Progressivity has always had its detractors, and proposals for a flat tax have
received increased attention in the last few years.4" To date, however, the
graduated rate system has been retained and continues to constitute an integral
part of the country's income tax system. It appears that there remains majority
support for progressivity, both in the body politic and in academia. In any
event, unless and until Congress dispenses with graduated rates, progressivity
remains one of the fundamental blocks of this country's income tax system.
The broad-based acceptance of a progressive income tax might lead one
to surmise that there is general agreement as to the theoretical justification for
that system. To the contrary, that is far from being the case. There are several
different justifications for graduated rates that have been proposed, and the
proponents of progressivity differ as to which they choose. Since the several
theories are not all compatible with each other, the proponents ofprogressivity
44. See Andrews, supra note 19.
45. See Kelman, supra note 8.
46. See infra Part V.C.
47. See supra note 21.
48. For more recent critiques, see, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 303 (1985); ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN
RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995). See also Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or
Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals,
12 AM. J. TA POL'Y 221 (1995).
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typically select one of them rather than relying on the cumulative thrust of
several rationales.49
A person's choice and acceptance of one of the several justifications
depends at least partly upon that person's view of distributive justice.5 ° There
can be no empirical test or syllogistic appraisal to determine whether
progressivity is appropriate or to determine which justification provides the
stronger case for it. Professors Galvin and Bittker correctly stated that the
choice of the appropriate rate structure depends upon "faith, personal
preference, or fiat."'"
In order to decide whether a tax provision, such as a personal deduction,
is justified under "normal" tax principles, one must first (1) assume that
normal tax principles exist, and (2) determine just what those principles are.
The author does not seek in this article to join the debate as to whether one
can truly argue that a normal or ideal tax structure exists; although, as noted
in the conclusion, a logical extension of the direction of this piece casts doubt
on this issue and the effectiveness of the tax expenditure concept. The thesis
of this article is that, assuming that the tax expenditure concept is valid, many
personal deductions do not constitute such expenditures. To the contrary,
those deductions promote principles that are part of the foundation of a
progressive income tax system. Since one of the tax principles on which this
thesis rests is the principle that underlies the choice of progressivity, it is
necessary to disclose which of the several justifications for progressivity the
author adopts.
The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, the 1952 article by Professors
Blum and Kalven,52 is still one of the most significant efforts to analyze the
merits of the various grounds both for and against a progressive tax system.53
49. See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation,
19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952). However, as noted later in the text, the "wealth maximization"
principle can operate together with one of the other justifications for progressivity.
50. The idea of distributive justice is that the recipients of benefits and burdens should
receive their share of those things according to some criterion. See Hanoch Dagan, Takings and
Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741,742 (1999) (citing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
122-25 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1985) and Ernest J. Weinrib, Aristotle's
Forms ofJustice, in JUSTICE, LAW AND METHOD IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 133, 135, 137, 139
(Spiro Panagiotou ed., 1987)); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
51. CHARLES 0. GALVIN & BORIS I. BITTKER, THE INCOME TAx: How PROGRESSIVE
SHOULD IT BE? 28 (1969).
52. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 49.
53. Since that article, many other commentators have discussed the subject. See, e.g.,
Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at
Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905 (1987); Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation
Revisited, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 739 (1995); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-
Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987);
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The principal theoretical justifications for progressivity, as discussed in that
piece, can be classified into four distinct types. These four types are briefly
summarized as follows in the ascending order of their strengths, as viewed by
the author.
A. Coordination with Benefits Enjoyed
All taxpayers receive benefits, both direct and indirect, from the federal
government and the benefits that the government provides are not enjoyed
equally by everyone. The benefits-received theory asserts that taxes should
be allocated among the populace in rough proportion to the extent to which
each individual derives benefits from the government.54 Thus, the contention
is that wealthier members of the populace derive greater benefits from
government than do others and therefore the tax rate should be progressive."
This belief relies heavily on faith, and perhaps on a political orientation. In
any event, even if a flat tax rate were employed, the wealthier will pay a
greater amount of tax than those with smaller incomes. In order to support
progressive tax rates, it is not enough to show that benefits increase as income
increases, but instead it must be proven that benefits increase more rapidly
than income, thus justifying the graduated tax rate schedule. It is far from
obvious that the tax rates for larger amounts of income must be greater if those
taxpayers are to pay taxes that are proportionate to their share of the benefits
Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven at 50: Progressive Taxation, 'Globalization, 'and the
New Millenium, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 731 (2000); Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the
Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919 (1997).
54. See Blum & Kalvin, supra note 49, at 45 1-55.
55. See id.
The more traditional place to begin the affirmative case for progression is with the
simple notion of estimating the benefits which the taxpayer purchases with taxes. No
one regards taxes as a completely one-sided transfer. Since it is obvious that each
taxpayer derives some benefits from the operation of government, the magnitude of
such benefits suggests itself as a standard for distributing the tax burden. If it can be
shown that the benefits increase as income increases, and that at some levels of
income benefits increase more rapidly than income, a compelling justification for
progression will have been established.
Id. at 451.
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provided to them by the government.56 The benefit theory is grounded on
questionable assumptions as to how government benefits are allocated and is
more fragile than the other justifications."
B. Wealth Maximization
The wealth maximization theory contends that the tax system should be
designed to maximize the amount of aggregate wealth of the entire populace.58
This approach elevates economic efficiency over egalitarian goals. Another
version of this approach is the view that the tax system should be one that
provides the greatest benefit for the largest number of people.59
It is questionable whether wealth maximization is served by utilizing
progressive tax rates. It can be contended that graduated rates will induce
taxpayers to work more hours or invest more dollars to produce greater after-
tax income. To the contrary, it may instead discourage additional hours of
work or investment because the net return will be valued less than the benefits
from employing those hours, or, in the case of investing, using funds, in
leisure activities. It would seem that wealth maximization is better served by
manipulating substantive tax provisions than by choosing atax rate structure.6
The categorization of the four types of rationales described herein is not
watertight. The fact that the wealth maximization theory emphasizes
economic efficiency makes it one that is compatible with the other
justifications for a progressive tax rate system. Economic efficiency is one of
the primary goals of general tax policy, regardless of the rationale that is
chosen for a progressive tax rate system. Legislators do not wish to have the
56. See Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L.
REv. 157, 183 (1999).
[Tihe question [of whether people ought to be taxed in proportion to the utility that
they derive from public goods] is probably completely unresolvable, both because of
the impossibility of measuring the relative utility levels each income class derives
from public goods, and because of conceptual problems in deciding what one ought
to be measuring.
Id. at 166.
57. See id. Even at the time of the article by Blum and Kalven, most public finance
textbooks mention the theory but treat it "as being only of historical or academic interest." Blum
& Kalven, supra note 49, at 451 n.92.
58. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 49, at 456-66.
59. See id.
60. Wealth maximization does appear to relate to progressivity in that it may provide
the ceiling for the top marginal tax rate. For example, the marginal utility of Bill Gates earning
another dollar may be zero, but it would not be advisable to have a tax rate of 100%, as that
would discourage any person in that bracket from earning that additional dollar, and society thus
would lose the goods or services that otherwise would have been produced.
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tax system adversely impact the economic well being of the nation. The
degree of progressivity that is incorporated in the tax rate schedules reflects
that concern, although, as stated, the consequence of implementing a policy
of wealth maximization seems more likely to lead to a reduction in
progressivity rather than an increase.6 Many of the deductions, credits, and
exclusions in the Internal Revenue Code are intended to promote economic
efficiency. Such provisions serve as a means of reducing the applicable tax
rates for certain activities in order to maximize national wealth. As a result,
national wealth maximization is one rationale that can operate in conjunction
with one of the other justifications, but it does not provide, on its own, a
convincing case for a progressive tax system.
C. Redistribution of Wealth
One might take the position that the earnings that a person obtains legally
should belong to that person. This sometimes is referred to as an entitlement
theory. But, many persons believe that there are unfair or arbitrary elements
to the market's allocation of wealth.62 The redistribution of wealth theory,
relying on one of several theories of distributive justice, requires that the tax
system should redistribute wealth from those with too much to those with too
little.63 A progressive tax system provides some redistribution of wealth.
61. See Fried, supra note 56, at 183.
In a world with perfect information, each person would have her own optimal tax
schedule, with rates set very high on inframarginal earnings, and declining, ultimately
to zero, on the last (marginal) dollar earned. In our actual world, where we cannot
observe people's true preferences, a degressive tax structure might best approximate
that ideal result.
Id. But see Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the
Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REv. 1, 80 (1998) (using the declining utility of
income as a premise, and arguing that when efficiency is measured by "after-tax private utility
rather than absolute dollars," progressive tax rates are more efficient than proportional rates).
62. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 49, at 497.
There are also the disturbing influences of fraud and duress which affect the
distribution of rewards and which have not been and cannot be perfectly policed.
Another factor is the periodic shifts in the value of money and in the level of
economic activity which have had a pronounced impact on the distribution pattern.
And there is always the element of sheer luck or chance which sometimes is the best
explanation of success or failure. Taking these factors together there undoubtedly is
a large amount of "undeserved" income distributed by our contemporary market
system.
Id.
63. See id. at 491-501. A critic might describe this approach as the "Robin Hood"
theory of taxation.
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Of course, if one believes that only the unwarranted or undeserved
income that a person receives should be redistributed, a progressive tax rate
structure is too crude an instrument to reach only the undeserved amount of
a taxpayer's income.64 But some believe that virtually all income is obtained
because of external conditions, such as education, social position and other
attributes given one by the accident of birth, so that the disparity between
incomes should be reduced to the extent that it is feasible to do so.6" Some
believe that an earner's merits have no bearing on entitlement to wealth, and
that a healthier society is one in which there are not large disparities in the
allocation of wealth regardless of how the wealth was earned.66
A tax system will necessarily redistribute wealth as an incident of
collecting money from persons different than those who receive the benefits
of governmental expenditures. It does not follow, however, that the tax
system should be designed to maximize the redistribution of wealth. One can
accept redistribution as an unavoidable element of taxation without embracing
the idea and enthusiastically embarking on maximizing the extent to which the
tax system has that effect. Nevertheless, redistribution is an important
justification in that a significant number of people believe that it is a proper
function of a tax system. Therefore, in examining personal deductions, the
redistributive justification will be considered.
D. General Equalization of Sacrifice
The equal sacrifice theory is built on the premise that taxation is the
means by which a government obtains the funds to conduct its governmental
functions.67 The theory itself is that all members of the populace should bear
part of that cost to the extent that they are able to do so, and that there should
be some general equality in the degree of sacrifice that is required of each
64. See id. at 497 ("Of greater importance is the difficulty of correlating the
'undeserved' income with the rates under a progressive schedule.").
65. See id. at 498.
From this perspective everyone's income is equally underserved, and the market,
however important its other functions, is an amoral distributor of rewards. If one
confesses to knowing nothing about who is entitled to the goods of the world then the
most prudent and sensible thing to do is count each man as one.
Id.
66. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 49, at 499. (It is also sometimes argued that any
person's "production requires the cooperation of many others [,i.e.,] [b]ecause all of these
efforts are indispensable to the final product it has seemed to some not possible to differentiate,
except arbitrarily, between the contributions of each to the final result.").
67. See id. at 421.
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member.6" The system of taxation that is chosen determines how the burden
of paying for the cost of operating the government is allocated among its
populace.
At first blush, this approach might seem to support a flat tax rate on all
taxpayers. But not all dollars of income are of equal value to their owner.
The amount of income that a person requires in order to pay for her
subsistence, or for the subsistence of her family, has greater value to that
person than dollars greatly in excess of that amount. It is a reasonable
assumption that once the need for an amount equal to the cost of subsistence
has been satisfied, the value or "utility" of additional dollars earned will
decline.69 Such is the case with commodities, and there seems to be no reason
why the same phenomenon would not occur when money is accumulated.
This declining curve of marginal utility means that the sacrifice incurred by
the taking of a dollar from someone who has $500,000 is less in utility terms
than the sacrifice suffered when a dollar is taken from someone who has only
$20,000. A progressive or graduated rate reflects the differences in marginal
utility of dollars of income to persons with different amounts of income.7"
Of course, the tax law's graduated rate structure cannot actually equalize
the sacrifice incurred by taxpayers with differing amounts of income. One
reason for this failure is that there are competing values to be satisfied in
setting the tax rate structure that prevent a true equalization of sacrifice. For
example, too high a marginal tax rate could deter the performance of
additional services or investment. Another consideration is that it may be
deemed important to have a large portion of the populace bear a share of the
cost of government so that they feel that they have contributed to the general
welfare and that there will be some constraint on the extent to which they will
support expensive governmental projects.
Practically speaking, it is difficult, if not impossible, to precisely
implement equal sacrifice since the marginal utility of dollars differs among
different persons. Obviously, it is not feasible to design a separate utility
68. See id. A subpart to this argument is that progressive taxation in the federal system
merely compensates for the regressivity of other taxes in the overall tax system, which makes
the total burden of all taxes proportionate to the taxpayer's income.
69. See id. at 456-57 ("A convenient shorthand for these assumptions is to say there is
a general utility curve for money which has a downward slope."). Commentators have noted
that while the declining utility of income is difficult to prove empirically, it likely is still a valid
theory. See McMahon & Abreu, supra note 61.
70. Note that the curve does not take into account a taxpayer's relative wealth. That is,
the utility of earning $100,000 will be different for a wealthy person than the utility of earning
that amount by a taxpayer with very little wealth. However, this country has adopted an income
tax, and therefore wealth considerations do not affect that tax rate schedule. Also, while far
from a perfect correlation, those who have larger income often have greater wealth.
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curve for each individual, and, even if it were feasible, it would not
necessarily be desirable to do so. Instead, the tax rates are set for the entire
populace. The tax rate schedule can be described as reflecting a standardized
crude utility curve for the nation.7
In the author's opinion, the equal sacrifice theory provides the most
compelling argument for progressivity.
IV. THE ROLE OF EXEMPTIONS AND THE ADDITIONAL STANDARD
DEDUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code provides a personal exemption for each
individual.72 This exemption constitutes an income tax deduction of a
specified amount.73 The effect of allowing this deduction is the application
of a zero rate of tax to that amount of income. The personal exemption is
merely part of the tax rate schedule, although it is framed in the form of a
deduction. Labeling it a deduction does not change the fact that it is actually
part of the rate schedule.74
In addition to a personal exemption, an individual may be given an
exemption deduction for a spouse if the two do not file a joint return. An
71. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 49, at 456 ("[I1n a fashion reminiscent of the law's
use of the reasonable man standard, the doctrine [of equal sacrifice] seeks to abstract out
individual differences and to make assumptions about the reactions to money that men have in
common.").
72. See I.R.C. § 151 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
73. See I.R.C. § 15 1(d).
74. Section 151(d)(3) purports to phase out the exemption deduction if the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income exceeds a specified threshold amount. While couched in the form of a
reduction, or even elimination, of the exemption deduction, the so-called phaseout is actually
an increase in the tax rate for income above the threshold amount. The effect of this provision
is exactly the same as providing that the tax rate on income above the threshold amount is
increased by X percent until the income reaches a specified level, after which the tax rate on
income above that level reverts to the prior rate. The so-called "reduction" constitutes a bubble
in the tax rate structure so that income within that bubble is taxed at a higher rate than both
income that is below the threshold level and income that is above the figure at which the
phaseout is complete. Congress employed the device of a "reduction" of the exemption
deduction as a cloak to disguise a marginal increase in the rate of tax on income within specified
brackets. This phaseout provision itself is scheduled to be phased out in the years beginning
after 2005. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-84,
§ 102(a), 115 Stat. 44 (June 7, 2001) [hereinafter EGTRRA] (adding I.R.C. § 151 (d)(3)(E), (F)).
The amount of the personal exemption that is phased out under current law is scheduled to be
reduced for the years between 2006 and 2009, and is scheduled for complete repeal after 2009.
However, due to a sunset provision, this repeal of the phaseout will itself terminate after 2010
unless Congress extends the repeal.
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individual also is allowed exemption deductions for certain dependents.75 The
addition of these exemptions constitutes an increase in the taxpayer's zero
bracket. In other words, a larger amount of the taxpayer's income is taxed at
a zero rate. These exemptions are provided because the standardized utility
curve, as reflected in the tax rate schedule, does not reflect the reality that the
amount needed for subsistence for an individual who is supporting a spouse
and dependents is greater than the amount needed by an individual who has
neither a spouse nor dependents. The additional exemptions are adjustments
to the tax rate schedule in order to reflect the difference between the utility
curve for such persons and the curve for those who have no such expenses.
These exemptions constitute a modest modification of the rate schedule in
recognition of the need to make a crude adjustment to the standardized utility
curve on which the rate schedule is based.76
It is noteworthy that the Code provides an addition to the standard
deduction that is allowed to a taxpayer who is blind or who is older than sixty-
four, and an addition if the taxpayer's spouse is blind or over the age of sixty-
four." The Joint Committee on Taxation treats these additional standard
deductions for being blind or aged as tax expenditures.7 8 But, these additional
deductions serve the same function as described above for the spousal and
dependency exemptions. They reflect the fact that when a person or her
spouse is blind or aged, she has greater subsistence expenses than do those
who are sighted or young. The additional deduction is merely an alteration of
the rate schedule to provide a larger zero bracket for persons whose utility
curve does not conform to the standardized norm. While it is not feasible to
structure individualized utility curves for every individual, rough adjustments
can be made for identifiable circumstances which are fairly common
occurrences. The fact that the additional standard deduction is not available
to taxpayers who choose to itemize their deductions does not change the
nature of that additional deduction. It is merely one more demonstration that
when Congress decided to raise tax rates on higher incomes, it sought to
disguise the fact that it was doing so.
75. See I.R.C. § 15 1(b), (c).
76. See Turnier, Evaluating Personal Deductions, supra note 40, at 280 ("Personal
exemptions, dependent deductions, and the zero bracket amount provide an adequate means of
allowing for basic expenditures for food and shelter.").
77. See I.R.C. § 63(f) (1994).
78. See JCT TAx EXPENDITURES, supra note 14, at 23.
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V. PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS-LET Us Now EXAMINE SOME OF THE
PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS TO SEE IF THEY ARE TRULY DEPARTURES FROM
"NORMAL" INCOME TAX PRINCIPLES
A. Medical Expenses
1. The Andrews Article
Medical expenses are itemized deductions to the extent that the aggregate
amount of such unreimbursed expenses in a taxable year exceeds 7.5% of the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 79 Thus, there is a statutory floor for the
allowance of a medical expense deduction, and only the unreimbursed medical
expenses in excess of that floor are deductible. These expenses are not
miscellaneous itemized deductions, and therefore are not subject to the 2% of
adjusted gross income floor imposed by section 67(a).80 Also, the medical
expense deduction is not subject to the overall limitation on itemized
deductions that is imposed by section 68. "
The medical expense deduction is listed as a tax expenditure in the Joint
Committee on Taxation's report.8 2 In his 1972 article, Professor Andrews
argued that the deduction is consistent with tax principles.83 Andrews argued
that while the Haig-Simons definition of income is accumulation of wealth
plus consumption, a deduction for certain types of personal expenditures
79. See I.R.C. § 213(a) (1994). Note that medical expenses may be deducted for
alternative minimum tax purposes only to the extent that they exceed 10% of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(F) (1994).
80. See I.R.C. § 67(b)(5) (1994).
81. See I.R.C. § 68(c)(1) (1994). The overall limitation on itemized deductions is
scheduled to be phased out for years beginning after 2005 and completely eliminated for years
beginning after 2009. See EGTRRA § 103(a) (adding I.R.C. § 68(f), (g)). However, due to a
sunset provision, this phaseout will itself terminate after 2010 unless Congress votes to extend
the repeal.
82. See JCT TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 14, at 22. Senator Edward Kennedy has
lambasted the medical expense deduction as an improper tax expenditure. See WILLIAM D.
ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 134-136 (4th ed. 1991) (reproducing Kennedy's
analysis); Surrey, supra note 14.
83. See Andrews, supra note 19.
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brings the tax system closer to the ideal tax base." With respect to the
medical expense deduction, Andrews stated:
I believe we can come to a better understanding of this deduction, and of what an
ideal personal income tax would be like, by asking whether there are good, intrinsic
reasons for elaborating the notion of taxable consumption - the consumption
component of taxable personal income - in a way that excludes medical services, so
that the medical expense deduction is a device for approaching the ideal, not a
departure from it.
8 5
Andrews began his examination of the medical expense deduction by
noting that the tax expenditure budget treats medical services in an
inconsistent manner.86 At the time of the article by Andrews, the tax
expenditure budget included in its list of tax expenditures the medical expense
deduction and medical services provided as a fringe benefit for employment.87
However, the benefit derived from the receipt of medical services provided by
charity or government welfare programs are excluded from the budget.88
Andrews also notes that a tort victim is not taxed on medical service expenses
that are reimbursed by the tortfeasor.89
Professor Andrews used the example of the reimbursement of expenses
by the tortfeasor as the proof of his main argument. The tort victim is not
taxed on such receipts because they merely return the taxpayer to the position
the taxpayer held before the injury occurred. Andrews believed that the same
considerations apply when the taxpayer himself bears the cost:
The critical nexus between injury and treatment does not depend on the fact that the
tortfeasor provides the treatment, but on the fact that the treatment only puts the
taxpayer back where others are who have suffered no injury. If we are willing to say
that one has had no taxable gain when he suffers an injury and then receives
treatment, we should say it in every case, whatever the source of payment for the
84. Seeid.at331.
But if we take it seriously that the ultimate purpose is to apportion tax burdens in
uniform, graduated relation to real consumption and accumulation, then we must be
willing, in principle at least, to consider whether there are some expenditures for
which a deduction should be allowed because the concept of consumption can be
better elaborated as part of an ideal tax base if the item purchased with the
expenditure is excluded than if it is included.
Id.
85. Id. at 333.
86. See id. at 314.
87. See JCTTAx EXPENDITURES, supra note 14, at 21-22.
88. See Andrews, supra note 19, at 334.
89. See id. That is still true today even when the victim suffers only emotional harm and
has no physical injury. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (1994). This exclusion is not listed in the current
tax expenditure budget. See JCT TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 14.
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treatment - whether or not the tortfeasor pays, whether or not there is a tortfeasor,
indeed whether the taxpayer's malady is a traumatic injury or an organic disease.
90
Therefore, while Andrews notes that medical expenses have the
characteristics of personal consumption expenditures since the person is using
up scarce resources, 9' he stresses that use of consumption as a tax base is an
attempt to measure "material well-being and taxable capacity."92 A person
who incurs medical expenses is not in good health and the expense is meant
to put the taxpayer back to a healthy well-being. 9' For example, assume A
earns $80,000 and is perfectly healthy. B earns $100,000 but is unwell and
must spend $20,000 in order to get back to the healthy state that A already
enjoys. If we ignore the floor, the medical expense deduction allows these
two taxpayers to be treated equally for tax purposes. Putting it differently and
bringing to bear the doctrine of progressivity, the amount that B spent on
medical costs can be viewed as part of her subsistence cost to which a zero tax
rate should be applied. Thus, B's subsistence cost is greater than A's who has
no medical needs. It is appropriate to apply a different tax schedule to B, and
the medical deduction accomplishes that.
2. Implementing the Principles of Progressivity
The medical deduction has been defended on several grounds: the
approach taken by Andrews, the involuntary nature of the expenditure, and the
reduction of ability to pay, which is related to the involuntariness ground.9
All of these have merit. In addition to these, the principles that underlie the
adoption of a progressive rate structure strongly support the allowance of a
medical expense deduction.
In theory, the tax rate structure is designed to permit the retention of
sufficient income to meet the subsistence needs that an individual has plus a
90. Andrews, supra note 19, at 334.
91. See supra Part II. Recall that the income tax is a tax on personal consumption and
the present value of future consumption.
92. Andrews, supra note 19, at 335.
93. Other authors have argued that medical expenses are similar to casualty losses,
which are deductible under § 165. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
A LAW STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 167, 170 (8th ed. 1999). The
theory is that a deduction is proper because the medical expense, like the casualty loss, is
unexpected and involuntary. Professor Andrews also refers to the involuntary nature of medical
costs in his defense of the deduction. See Andrews, supra note 19, at 336.
94. See Turnier, Personal Deductions and Tax Reform, supra note 40, at 1730
("Because of the significant involuntary nature of medical expenses ... continuation of the
deduction indeed is of great significance if one wishes to design an income tax system
predicated upon ability to pay.").
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portion of the amounts in excess thereof. Thus, the personal exemptions
provide a zero tax rate to the income needed for subsistence. While that
amount is not adequate for subsistence, other provisions, such as the earned
income credit, combine with the exemptions to insulate a larger amount from
taxation. The utilization of a standardized utility curve as a reference for the
tax rate schedule results in applying graduated rates to income above the
insulated amount, thereby reflecting the declining utility of added amounts of
income. Because the utility curve that the statutory rate structure represents
is necessarily crude and standardized, it is appropriate to make adjustments for
events that commonly occur, are readily identified, and result in a very
different set of financial needs than those of the average taxpayer. Since most
individuals suffer minor illnesses from time to time, a certain amount of
medical expense is accommodated in the rate schedule as part of ordinary
living expenses. However, a serious illness that requires large expenditures
cannot be considered part of ordinary living expenses. It is reasonable to alter
the tax rate schedule for persons who incur such large expenses in order to
mitigate the harshness that applying a standardized utility curve would
impose. The medical expense deduction is a rough adjustment to the rate
schedule to reflect the greater utility that the dollars so expended have for a
taxpayer in that condition.95 The adoption of a floor on the deduction of 7.5%
of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income is the method by which Congress
ensures that only expenses greatly in excess of everyday medical costs are
deductible.
This analysis rests on the equal sacrifice justification for progressive tax
rates. One might be tempted to argue that this analysis proves too much and
that it would justify a change in the tax rate schedules for anyone who spent
a sizeable amount of money. That is, any time a person spends money and
does not thereby acquire an asset that could be liquidated for an equal amount,
that person's utility curve for unspent income is altered. For example, A and
B each earn $100,000. A spends $80,000 to take a pleasure cruise around the
world, and B stays home and spends nothing on vacations. On account ofA's
expending so much on a vacation, A's utility for the remaining $20,000 of
income he received is greater than B's utility for the same amount of dollars.
Should a deduction be provided to reflect the change in utility? Obviously,
the answer is "no," and the analysis above does not suggest otherwise. A's
purchase of the vacation is merely an allocation of dollars that the rate
schedule leaves to A for personal consumption purposes. The utility curve on
95. See Laura E. Cunningham, National Health Insurance and the Medical Deduction,
50TAx L. REv. 237,245 (1995) ("In utilitarian terms, the deduction is necessary to equalize the
marginal utility of income of a sick taxpayer and a healthy taxpayer who are otherwise similarly
situated but for large medical expenses, that is, to put them on the same curve.").
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which the rate schedule is based is a standardized curve that does not reflect
the appetite that any single individual might have for consumption.
Adjustments are to be made only for those events or conditions that elicit the
view that the application of the standardized curve in those circumstances
would be grossly inappropriate. For example, if a taxpayer has greater
subsistence expenses than the rate schedule contemplates because of certain
events such as the birth of a child or the need for medical treatment, that can
warrant making an adjustment to the rate schedule. It is a value judgment as
to whether the event or condition is one that merits a rate adjustment. But,
this adjustment is made on the basis of providing an equitable rate schedule
that carries out the principles of progressivity; it is not made to finance a
desired program. The equitable implementation of the principles of
progressivity do not create tax expenditures; instead, they are integral parts of
the progressive income tax system itself.
The medical expense deduction also is consistent with the redistributive
justification for progressivity. Persons who incur large medical expenses have
less disposable income available for redistribution, and therefore it is not a
departure from that principle to take those expenses into account in
determining how much of a taxpayer's income to redistribute.
As discussed in more detail below, by utilizing a percentage of adjusted
gross income as a floor, rather than adopting a specified floor amount, the tax
law reflects the fact that persons with higher incomes, and thus with larger
disposable income, likely will spend more on medical matters than will those
with fewer resources.96 Also, by utilizing a percentage of adjusted gross
income, the Code deals with the fact that medical expenses can include items
that have some pleasurable attributes and that high income taxpayers are more
likely to expend more for such items. In the author's opinion, the adoption of
7.5% of adjusted gross income as the floor is too high, but the principle of
using a percentage of adjusted gross income as a floor is valid.
3. The Kelman Response
In his 1979 article, Professor Kelman raised several objections to
Professor Andrews' defense of the medical expense deduction. 97 For example,
Professor Kelman objected to Andrews' resort to the involuntariness of
medical expenses as a defense for the deduction. Kelman argued that there is
a considerable degree of voluntariness in the taxpayer's choice of how much
96. Professor Andrews, while noting the existence of the 3% of adjusted gross income
floor that was in place at that time, did not use the floor to justify his conclusions.
97. See Kelman, supra note 8.
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to spend on medical treatment and the type of treatment to seek.9" According
to Kelman, this problem is aggravated by the fact that some medical expenses
can also provide pleasurable benefits." For example, the addition of an air
conditioning unit to relieve a medical condition also can provide comfort in
hot weather, and the addition of a swimming pool to the taxpayer's house can
provide pleasurable as well as therapeutic benefits.
The short answer to this objection is that the medical expense is in the
same position in that respect as are business expenses that are clearly
deductible. 0 A taxpayer can choose how much to expend on her business
ventures. The taxpayer's power to control the amount expended does not
change the business character of the expense or its deductibility. If a taxpayer
travels on business, she can travel first class or she can travel economy class.
She can dine at McDonald's or she can dine at an upscale restaurant, so long
as it is not lavish or extravagant. Business is conducted by human beings, and
consequently it is not always possible to disentangle the personal element of
an expense from the business element. That is not true of all business
expenses, but it is true of some of them. Similarly, many medical expenses
provide no pleasurable benefits while others do. Those that do have the same
characteristics as business expenses that provide some pleasure.
Professor Kelman discounted the business expense/medical expense
analogy for two reasons. First, he believed that the tax system must allow
some deduction for business expenses because the determination of net
income, as a general rule, incorporates a reduction for the cost of earning
income. Second, he believed that the administrative cost of determining
whether the taxpayer had mixed motives for expenses incurred in her business
is too great to require that that differentiation be made.' Kelman argued that
these same two reasons do not apply to medical expenses. Concerning his
first point for business expenses, Kelman classified the medical expense
deduction as, "at best an unusual attempt to refine the tax base to account for
psychic income" and therefore not integral to the tax system.0 2 As to his
second consideration, Kelman believed that the administrative difficulties of
separating personal from medical motives are not as great as those in the
business expense area. He suggested that allowing a deduction of a specified
amount for specific ailments could solve that problem. 3
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See Griffith, supra note 13, at 371 n. 159 (noting the similarity between voluntary
medical expenses and mixed business and personal expenditures).
101. See Kelman, supra note 8, at 876.
102. Id.
103. See id.
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Professor Kelman's arguments do not contravene the thesis of this article.
His arguments concern the question of whether, as a matter of good policy, the
medical expense deduction should be retained rather than whether the
deduction is nonneutral. Kelman does imply that the deduction of some
medical costs cannot be justified as neutral. Even if that were so, that does
not make the allowance of a deduction for all medical costs nonneutral.
Congress could decide that the amount of such expenses that are nonneutral,
assuming arguendo that there are any, are relatively minor, and that the
administrative costs of segregating such items from those that are neutral are
too great to warrant an individualized identification of them. Instead,
Congress has dealt with this matter by imposing a floor on the deduction
which can be seen as an administratively feasible way of disallowing a
deduction for personal expenses that are disguised as medical costs. Whatever
one thinks of the merits of those Congressional choices, that does not go to the
question of whether the deduction is a tax expenditure. Indeed, although it is
a bit unclear, there is some reason to believe that Kelman himself does not
regard medical expenses as tax expenditures."° Regardless, the author has
addressed Kelman's arguments in this article because they are commonly
considered when this issue arises and because Kelman did raise baseline
issues concerning some medical expenses.
Moreover, the use of a percentage of adjusted gross income as the floor
for medical expense deductions addresses Kelman's concern. As discussed
above, the use of a floor based on adjusted gross income, rather than a flat
amount, takes into account the fact that wealthier taxpayers are more likely to
have medical expenses that may have some pleasurable aspects. The
justification for using such a crude adjustment is the avoidance of
administrative cost -the same justification that Professor Kelman had for his
104. See id. at 833. Near the beginning of his piece, Kelman states:
In place of the tax expenditure concept, Professor Andrews approves the charitable
and medical deductions for reasons "intrinsic" to the tax system: The government can
measure the taxpayer's very capacity to pay taxes, and the extent of the claims the tax
system canjustly make on her, only after excluding certain categories of uses from the
tax base. My basic dispute with Professor Andrews concerns what constitutes the
appropriate tax base.
Id. (citation omitted). Later in the piece, Kelman states that he explicitly rejects the "tax
expenditure argument[]." Id. at 855. The fact that Kelman disputes the tax base of Andrews
suggests that Kelman does not believe that these deductions should be considered nonneutral.
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proposed substitution of a standardized amount of deduction for specified
ailments. 05
Professor Kelman also argued that a medical expense deduction should
not be allowed to taxpayers because he believes that some medical conditions
are a result of a voluntary past action of the taxpayer. Kelman uses an
example of two smokers, A and B. A quits smoking, does not contract cancer,
but loses the pleasure that she had when she was smoking. B, on the other
hand, continues to smoke, contracts cancer, and takes medical expense
deductions for the cost of the resulting medical care. Kelman thus suggested
that perhaps the ideal baseline proposed by Andrews should be modified "to
include ordinary taxable consumption and health and pleasure from.. . risky
activities: A deduction for the loss of health without inclusion of the gains
from risky activities will mismeasure how relatively well-off the two
taxpayers are.'
10 6
The implication of Professor Kelman's points is that either the exclusion
from tax of the value of the pleasure obtained from engaging in excessively
risky activities" 7 should be listed as a tax expenditure or the current allowance
of a deduction for medical expenses that are attributable to risky behavior
should be so listed. Obviously, there would be enormous administrative
difficulties and cost in classifying which activities are risky and which are not,
in determining whether a taxpayer has engaged in such excessively risky
activities, and, in the case of taxing the pleasure obtained from such activities,
in placing a dollar value on that pleasure. It would not be feasible to enforce
either of those provisions, i.e., the taxation of pleasure or the denial of
105. For a comparable resolution of a similar issue in the business expense area, see
I.R.C. § 274(n), which limits the deductibility of business meals and business entertainment
expenses to 50% of the cost. See I.R.C. § 274(n) (1994). Thus, Congress recognized that while
those expenses had valid business purposes, the taxpayer also had personal enjoyment
therefrom, and the meal consumed substituted for a personal expense that the taxpayer otherwise
would have incurred.
106. Kelman, supra note 8, at 869. It is interesting that Professor Kelman used the
smoking example since one could argue that, with such a high cigarette tax, the government is
taxing risky behaviorjust as Professor Kelman urged. This is especially so since the settlement
between states and the cigarette manufacturers effectively amounts to a tax on the sale of
cigarettes, since the settlement costs will be passed through to consumers in the form of higher
prices. See also Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious
Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354 (2000).
107. Kelman refers only to "risky" activities, but it is inconceivable that he means thereby
to include the normal risks that attend everyday activities. If A walks to the local market four
blocks from her New York apartment, she incurs traffic risks and is exposed to a risk of assault
even if she lives in a safe neighborhood. Kelman cannot refer to these risks, but rather must
mean risks that go beyond those that are part of ordinary life. He does not indicate how far
beyond ordinary risk an activity must be to fall within his classification.
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deductions for selected medical expenses. Professor Kelman does not suggest
that the tax system should undertake that task. To the contrary, his point is
that in light of those tax expenditure items and the administrative infeasibility
of reaching them in the tax system, no deduction should be allowed for any
medical expenses. But, since risky activities cannot be singled out due to
administrative difficulties, the failure to tax those items is not a tax
expenditure. Tax expenditures refer to provisions in the tax law that aid
specific persons or industries; they do not refer to provisions that serve
functions which are integral elements of the tax system itself. Taxation is a
practical scheme, and adjustments made to the tax system because of
administrative costs or difficulties are part of that system and not departures
to carry out an unrelated program.' In the case of excessively risky
activities, the administrative difficulties that would accompany any effort to
tax them, or to deny deductions for medical expenses attributable to them,
would not merely be costly; it would not be feasible to administer.
Professor Kelman concluded that the practical inability to single out
medical expenses that are attributable to risky behavior contravenes Andrews'
argument that a medical expense deduction is justified under an ideal tax
system. 9 As noted above, administrative difficulties are not a tax
expenditure issue. They do, however, raise a legitimate legislative issue as to
whether the difficulty warrants eliminating the deduction entirely, as Kelman
would have it, or ignoring the problem as a relatively minor element.
Reasonable people can disagree on that issue, but it is not a question of tax
neutrality and has no bearing on the tax expenditure issue.
While there can be little doubt that the segregation of risky activities for
tax purposes would pose horrendous administrative costs, there are other valid
reasons that a distinction should not be made. An identification and
application of different tax treatments for medical expenses that are
attributable to risky behavior would contravene an important principle of
government, which includes the tax system. It is undesirable to have a
government agency, i.e., the Internal Revenue Service, inquire into a person's
private life to determine whether medical expenses were caused by some type
of past behavior or to tax that behavior for the pleasure derived thereby. It
would be highly intrusive for the Internal Revenue Service to examine the type
of food that taxpayers with heart disease had previously consumed, to see if
the taxpayer had eaten high cholesterol foods, or the way that taxpayers
108. For example, unrealized appreciation that occurred during ayear would fit under the
Haig-Simons definition of income. Yet, all of the tax expenditure budgets accept that the
realization requirement is an integral part of our tax system and is not nonneutral. A major
reason is the administrative difficulties that an attempt to tax that appreciation would generate.
109. See Kelman, supra note 8.
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conducted their private lives. Government inquiry of that sort raises the
specter of George Orwell's "Big Brother.""'  The concern for protecting
privacy is reflected in numerous tax provisions. For example, consider the
criteria for determining whether a noncompensated transfer of property
constitutes a gift. The determination could have been made to rest on the
basis of the actual relationship between the transferor and the transferee, i.e.,
how friendly or intimate they are. But, that would have required the
government to inquire into a very private aspect of peoples' lives. Instead, the
determination was made to rest on the intention that the transferor had for
making the transfer' 1 - a subjective, but less intrusive, inquiry. Similarly,
consider the tax law determination of whether stock holdings of certain
taxpayers should be aggregated and treated as if held by a single person.
Instead of examining the actual relationships of the parties, the Code applies
stock attribution rules which turn on the objective status of the parties,
regardless of how hostile or friendly they may be.' 2 Thus, a rule to disallow
deductions on the basis of past activity of a very personal nature, or to tax the
pleasure derived from that activity, would contravene one of the basic
principles of the tax system, and indeed of the operation of government itself.
As noted above, taxation of excessively risky activities raises another
concern. In order to implement such tax treatment either to tax risky activities
or to deny deductions for their consequences, the government would need to
determine what activities should be classified as overly risky. Would skiing
be considered an overly risky activity so that a person who broke her leg while
engaging in the sport would not qualify for the medical expense deduction?
If a person is injured in an automobile accident while riding in a car that
possesses less than the best safety record, would no deduction be allowed?
How much variance from the maximum safety conditions is permissible? The
setting of such standards necessarily invokes arbitrary line drawing and is
inappropriate for a governmental body to utilize in passing on the conduct of
citizens in their everyday life.
This discussion is not meant to argue the conclusion that Congress must
allow a deduction for medical expenses. Nor does it advocate the position that
if Congress allows a deduction, it should not impose limitations on the amount
thereof in order to accommodate the concerns expressed by Professor Kelman
or to accommodate other concerns. Those issues should be considered and
resolved on their merits. However, they have no relevance to the question of
whether medical expense deductions are part of a normal income tax
system-i.e., whether the medical expense deduction conforms with the
110. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
111. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
112. See, e.g.,I.R.C. §318(1994).
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principles that underlie the progressive income tax structure. The
consequence of characterizing the medical expense deduction as a nonneutral
provision or, in other words, as a tax expenditure, is to impose a greater
burden of persuasion on those who would retain the deduction in the Code.
There is no reason to impose a heavier burden on persons on either side of that
issue. The question of the retention of the medical expense deduction should
be resolved in the light of social, political, and economic policies. The
analysis should not be skewed by branding the deduction with a scarlet letter
by listing it in the tax expenditure budget.
4. Medical Insurance Receipt
In addition to a medical expense deduction, the Code also excludes from
income amounts received because of an illness or injury through a medical
insurance policy. "3 The exclusion of such amounts is comparable to allowing
a deduction for the medical expenses that the insurance company reimburses,
except that there is no floor imposed on the amount excluded. The conclusion
that the medical expense deduction does not lie outside of tax principles
applies equally to the exclusion of medical insurance proceeds for the same
reasons. The absence of a floor does not alter the character of the exclusion
as being within tax principles; instead it raises a question as to why such
medical reimbursements are given more favorable tax treatment than is
accorded to the taxpayer's direct payment of the medical expenses, which is
subject to a 7.5% floor. One possible justification for the difference in
treatment between medical expenses and medical reimbursements is that
medical reimbursements are subject to the scrutiny and veto of an independent
third party, the insurer, and that check on the amounts expended minimizes the
risks of expenditures being greater than needed. Still, there is a question of
whether no floor, rather than a lower floor than that used for medical
expenses, is appropriate. This question of the difference in treatment should
be examined and resolved on its merits, but the resolution of that issue should
not be influenced by characterizing the exclusion as being outside of the ideal
or normal tax structure.
Another issue is whether the fact that medical insurance premiums paid
by the taxpayer may have been deducted as medical expenses, if the aggregate
amount of taxpayer's medical expenses exceeded the floor and the taxpayer
itemized her deductions, should cause some of the insurance proceeds to be
taxed as a kind of recapture of the prior deductions. One aspect of this issue
113. See I.R.C. §§ 104(a)(3), 105(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Medical reimbursements
made by a taxpayer's employer also are excluded. See I.R.C. § 105(b).
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is that, because of the floor, premiums often are not deducted, and there is a
substantial administrative cost to determining if deductions were taken and in
what amounts. An even more important obstacle is the difficulty of
determining the extent, if any, to which current insurance receipts are
attributable to premiums paid in prior years. For example, if X received
$100,000 in medical reimbursement payments from a policy that she had held
and paid premiums thereon for thirty-five years, arguably none of the
insurance proceeds is attributable to premiums paid in prior years. If X had
changed insurers for the current year and had bought a new medical insurance
policy, there would be no basis for treating part of the insurance proceeds as
a recapture of payments made to the previous insurer. The most that could be
said to be recaptured is the premium paid for coverage in the period in which
the cost was incurred. The result should be the same when no change of
insurer has been made. This issue also should be resolved on its merits. The
same issue arises when the insurance premiums were paid by the taxpayer's
employer and excluded from the taxpayer's income under section 106. There
are arguments to be made on both sides of those issues, but the tax
expenditure concept does not provide any help in resolving them.
The exclusion from an employee's income of premiums paid by the
employer also is akin to allowing a deduction for the premium payment
without any floor on the amount that is deductible." 4 What justification is
there for imposing a floor on the deduction for premiums that are paid directly
by an individual when no floor is imposed when the premiums are paid by the
employer? There seems to be no justification for the difference in treatment.
It is noteworthy that prior to 1983, the tax law allowed an itemized deduction,
not to exceed $150, for one-half of the medical insurance premiums that were
paid by an individual, and there was no floor on the deductibility of those
payments." 5
Note that the statutory exclusion from income of payments received on
medical insurance coverage because of an illness or injury is not listed in the
Joint Committee on Taxation's tax expenditure budget. As shown above,
there is no real difference between a deduction for medical expenses and the
exclusion of medical reimbursements. Therefore, the Joint Committee on
Taxation, in determining what should be considered nonneutral for purposes
of the tax expenditure budget, appears to be acting arbitrarily by labeling the
medical deduction nonneutral and the exclusion of medical reimbursements
neutral. This unwarranted difference in treatment adds support for opponents
of the tax expenditure concept.
114. See I.R.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
115. See I.R.C. § 213(a)(2) (1994), amended by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 202(a), 96 Stat. 324, 421.
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B. Casualty and Theft Losses
Section 165(c)(3) grants a deduction for a casualty or theft loss suffered
by property that was not connected with a trade or business or with a
transaction entered into for profit." 6 The losses from such casualties and
thefts are sometimes referred to as "personal casualty loss[es]. ' " In most
cases, the deduction for personal casualty losses will be an itemized
deduction,"' but it will not be a miscellaneous itemized deduction and will not
be subject to the section 68 overall limitation on itemized deductions." 9
There are limitations on the amount of deduction that is allowable for
personal casualty losses. One limitation is that no deduction is allowable to
the extent that the taxpayer is reimbursed for the loss or has a reasonable
prospect of being reimbursed. 20 Also, there are two floors that limit the
amount of deduction that can be taken. For each personal casualty or theft,
$100 of the loss is not deductible.' 2 ' The remaining amount of such losses can
be deducted to the extent that the taxpayer has personal casualty gains.'22 The
aggregate personal casualty loss in excess of the taxpayer's aggregate personal
casualty gain is deductible only to the extent that the amount of that excess
exceeds 10% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income.'
The Joint Committee on Taxation's 2001 report lists the deduction for
personal casualty and theft losses as a tax expenditure.'24 The rationale for
that characterization is that, since the property that was damaged or destroyed
was not used in a business or profit-oriented activity, the loss can be viewed
as attributable to the consumption of a good that was acquired and held for
noncommercial reasons. In other words, part of the cost of possessing an asset
for personal reasons is the risk that it might be damaged or stolen, and so the
loss can be seen as attendant to the consumption of that item.
However, a stronger case can be made that these deductions are not tax
expenditures. A taxpayer's purchase of an asset for personal use is a
nondeductible expenditure. The exhaustion of the asset by the taxpayer's use
of it does not create any deductions because the taxpayer is consuming the
116. See I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (1994).
117. 1.R.C. § 165(h)(3)(B).
118. To the extent that a taxpayer's personal casualty losses do not exceed his personal
casualty gains, they will be nonitemized deductions. See I.R.C. § 165(h)(4)(A).
119. See I.R.C. §§ 67(b)(3), 68(c)(3).
120. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2) (2001) (as amended in 1977).
121. See I.R.C. § 165(h)(1).
122. See I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(B).
123. See I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(A).
124. See JCT TAX ExPENDITURES, supra note 14, at 23. The tax expenditure budget also
includes casualty loss deductions that offset casualty gains.
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asset within the meaning of the Haig-Simons definition of income. But, if the
value of the asset is reduced or destroyed by a casualty or theft, that loss is not
attributable to the taxpayer's use of the asset. Rather, it is the consequence of
the intervention of an external force. It is true that the taxpayer would not
have incurred that loss but for her acquisition of the asset for personal use; but
it was not the use itself that caused the loss. Even if the loss from the casualty
or theft was treated as a consumption by the taxpayer of that asset, it would
not be a consumption from which the taxpayer derived any benefit.
Putting it another way, if the exhaustion of a societal good is attributable
to a taxpayer's use of the item, there is a justification for taxing the taxpayer
for having used up that portion of society's goods. But, when an item is
destroyed by a casualty or theft, while it is lost to society, it is not lost due to
the taxpayer's enjoyment of the item. The societal loss would have been the
same if the item had been owned by a museum when it was destroyed. The
happenstance that the item was owned by a taxpayer when it was destroyed
was not a factor in the loss that society incurred.'25
There is an additional compelling reason that the deduction for a loss due
to theft is not a tax expenditure. As previously noted, the tax on income is a
surrogate for taxing the depletion of societal goods, or the power to consume
and thereby use up goods in the future, but stolen items are not removed from
the pool of society resources. When a taxpayer transfers cash or other
property to someone for the performance of a service, the loss to society is the
services that the taxpayer received and used up. Society has not lost the
property received by the service provider since that property remains intact.
In the case of a theft, the stolen property remains intact, and no services were
provided to the taxpayer so none were used up.
The proper tax treatment of theft or casualty losses can be put into focus
by comparing the relative positions of two taxpayers, A and B. A and B have
the same amount of income, the same amount of wealth, and each purchases
a painting for $100,000. The purpose of their acquisitions is personal
enjoyment rather than investment. Both A and B utilize earnings that
previously have been taxed to purchase their paintings. Since each has paid
tax on the $100,000 of income that is used to purchase the painting, each is
entitled to consume that amount without incurring any additional tax. A and
B each displays the painting in her home. A fire in A's home, caused by a
faulty electrical wire, destroys A's painting, which is uninsured and which still
had a value of $100,000 at the time of its destruction. This is a personal
125. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(3)(i) (2001). If the loss was caused by a negligent act
ofthe taxpayer, tax law nevertheless allows a deduction, provided that the taxpayer's negligence
was not willful. While the case for a deduction is weaker when the damage is not caused by an
external force, the societal loss is not attributable to a benefit that the taxpayer enjoyed.
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casualty loss. A has no personal casualty gains for that year. B continues to
possess her painting, which has the same value of $100,000. In determining
the tax rates to be applied to the incomes of A and B, should the rate schedule
for both be based on the same utility curve? A has lost the opportunity to
consume the $100,000 that she invested in the painting, but B still can sell the
painting and use the proceeds to purchase consumable goods or services. The
fire altered A's financial position so that she and B no longer occupy similar
economic status. It is appropriate for some adjustment to be made to the rate
schedule that is applied to A to reflect the fact that she has less disposable
wealth than does B and therefore will attach greater value to additional dollars
of income than will B. One way to alter the tax rate schedule for A is to
provideA with some amount of deduction for her loss. The tax law limitsA's
deduction to the amount by which the loss exceeds the sum of 10% of her
adjusted gross income and $100. Thus, only unusually large casualty losses
are deductible and only to the extent that such losses exceed a substantial
floor. This reflects the fact that some casualty loss is expected in everyday life
and is accounted for in the standardized rate schedule.
One could argue that the loss of wealth due to a casualty or theft should
not be taken into account for tax purposes because this country's tax system
is an income tax rather than a wealth tax, and so no adjustment is made to
income tax rates because of the disparities of wealth among taxpayers. If tax
rates were adjusted for disparities of wealth, that would incorporate a wealth
tax system.126  A casualty or theft loss, however, raises additional
considerations. The lost item represents an investment of after-tax
dollars - that is, the taxpayer, or her predecessor, paid income tax on the
dollars that were lost and so the taxpayer is entitled to consume those dollars
without incurring any additional tax. The loss of that item due to an
unexpected and sudden event disables the taxpayer from further consumption
of the lost items or money. By allowing a deduction for the lost item, the
taxpayer is able to consume an amount equal to that which was lost without
incurring any additional tax. In other words, the deduction insulates that
amount of income from taxation and thereby allows the taxpayer to use that
amount for consumption purposesj ust as the taxpayer could have used the lost
item for such purposes. The taxpayer never got to partake of the consumption,
the right for which she had paid a tax, and the deduction protects the
taxpayer's right to that consumption. It is a matter of policy whether the
taxpayer's right to use that amount for consumption should be protected by the
income tax system, but that is an issue that goes to the structure of the tax
system rather than to a programmatic purpose.
126. See supra note 70 for an explanation.
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Another example is worth considering. A, a cash method taxpayer,
provides services for which she is entitled to be paid $100,000. Payment is to
be made by a cashier at the employer's office building. A goes to the cashier
and collects $100,000 in cash. When A collects the $100,000, it is included
in her gross income for that year. As A leaves the building, she is mugged,
and the thief takes A's $100,000. If no deduction is allowed A, she will be
taxed on the $100,000 income that she held for less than a minute. In no sense
can A be said to have consumed the $100,000.
If the theft of the cash had not occurred, and ifA had promptly gone to an
art store and used the $100,000 to purchase a painting for that amount, and if
on leaving the art store, A was mugged and the painting stolen, there is no
more reason to treat A as having consumed the painting than A can be said to
have consumed the $100,000 cash in the previous hypothetical.'27 Similarly,
if A took the painting home where it was destroyed that night by a fire, the
painting cannot be said to have been lost to society by A's use or consumption
of it.
The allowance of a deduction for a casualty or theft loss conforms to the
policy justifications for a progressive income tax under both the equal
sacrifice theory or the redistributive justification theory. In the case of the
former policy justification, the income that A received will be more valuable
to him than the same amount of income that B received, and it is appropriate
for the tax system to take that into account so as to equalize sacrifice. In the
case of the latter policy justification, A has less wealth to redistribute than B
has, and so less should be taken from A in the form of a tax.
C. Charitable Contributions
Section 170 provides a tax deduction for gifts to qualified charitable
organizations. 28 There is a ceiling on the amount of deduction that is
allowable, and there are requirements that must be met for a gift to qualify for
the deduction. The deduction must be itemized and is subject to the overall
limitation on itemized deductions imposed by section 68.129 However, it does
not constitute a miscellaneous itemized deduction. 0 The charitable deduction
under section 170 is listed as a tax expenditure in the Joint Committee on
127. See Turnier, Evaluating Personal Deductions, supra note 40, at 272 n.49 (arguing
that the Code's treatment of property as being consumed when it was initially acquired is
inconsistent with the Code's treatment of business capital goods, which must be depreciated
over a period of years).
128. See I.R.C. § 170 (1994).
129. See supra note 81 for a discussion of the phaseout of the limitation.
130. See I.R.C. § 67(b)(4).
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Taxation's Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2001 to
2005.'
Some commentators have criticized the charitable deduction. The
deduction has been called a "matching program" where the government
effectively matches a part of the gift given by the taxpayer on account of the
deduction. However, commentators have noted that there is no government
oversight of how the government's "matching" funds are used."2
As many commentators have noted, the key question here is whether a
charitable contribution constitutes a personal consumption. 33 The resolution
of this issue rests on the previously discussed Haig-Simons definition of
income, which equates income with accumulation of wealth plus the market
value of personal consumption. If a charitable contribution represents an item
that is neither accumulated nor personally consumed, then it is not within the
Haig-Simons definition of income. Since the two principal commentaries on
this issue were written by Professors Andrews and Kelman, respectively, let
us first examine what they said. After considering those commentaries, the
author will propose an alternative and independent reason that the deduction
does not contravene neutrality.
1. The Andrews Article
Professor Andrews contended that the charitable deduction is not contrary
to neutral tax principles. 4 In support of his position, he set forth the example
of a taxpayer who donates money to a charitable organization that
redistributes such amounts to the poor.'35 Andrews argued that, in this case,
131. See JCT TAX EXPENDITuRES, supra note 14, at 21-22 (splitting the deductions into
three groups: (]) charitable contributions to educational institutions, (2) charitable contributions
to health organizations, and (3) all other charitable contributions).
132. See RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx 162 (rev. ed. 1976). It is an
exaggeration to say that there is no oversight. There is some government oversight since
charitable contributions are allowed only when donated to § 501(c)(3) organizations which
qualify for the approval of the Internal Revenue Service. However, there is no government
oversight as to how the specific funds donated by the taxpayer are used. Section 501(c)(3)
merely looks to the stated overall purpose of the organization and to the general uses to which
its funds are put.
Commentators also have argued that charitable organizations that receive deductible
contributions from taxpayers should be subject to the same federal civil rights laws to which
groups that receive direct federal assistance are subject. See, e.g., David A. Brennen, Tax
Expenditures, Social Justice, and Civil Rights: Expanding the Scope of Civil Rights Laws to
Apply to Tax-Exempt Charities, 2001 BYU L. REV. 167, 170-71.
133. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 19.
134. See id. at 345.
135. See id. at 347.
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"the consumption or accumulation of real goods and services represented by
the funds" are shifted from the taxpayer to the poor.'36 Since the taxpayer is
not consuming or accumulating the donated money, the taxpayer should not
be subject to taxation on it.1 7
Professor Andrews also noted that the charitable deduction equalizes the
treatment between taxpayers that donate their income to charitable
organizations and taxpayers that donate their services. 8 He used the example
of a doctor who chooses to donate her services one day a week to a clinic for
low-income patients.'39 The doctor is not taxed on the value of her services. 40
However, a tax lawyer, who is equally as generous as the doctor but without
the same useful skills, may donate part of her income to the clinic to pay for
services that the clinic requires. 4 ' Andrews argued that the tax lawyer and the
doctor should be treated the same by the tax laws, and granting a charitable
deduction to the tax lawyer puts them in equal tax positions. 4 2 Professor
Andrews acknowledged that imputed income is never taxed when the service
provider receives nothing in return, and the failure to tax the doctor is merely
one application of that general principle.'43 But, Andrews argued that the
failure to tax imputed income is a function of not taxing household services
because of practical considerations rather than that of a tax principle.'44
Andrews argued that the restraint against taxing household services does not
apply to services performed for charitable organizations,'45 and, as a result,
136. Id. The same argument could be said to apply to gifts to family and friends, i.e., the
taxpayer is shifting the income to other persons. However, the taxpayer does get some
consumption benefit from the vicarious enjoyment derived from the donated use of the gift, and
there is the practical consideration that treating family gifts in this manner would facilitate tax
evasion via income shifting. Nevertheless, Professor Andrews compared the treatment of the
charitable deduction with ordinary family gifts, stating that, "[i]deally, perhaps, the tax should
be on the donee rather than the donor," but he notes the contrary considerations of the simplicity
of taxing the donor and the income shifting problem. Id. at 348. Professor Andrews also argued
"that consumption is largely a household rather than an individual function," and therefore the
household is the appropriate unit for determination of the applicable tax rate. Id. at 349.
137. See Andrews, supra note 19, at 349.
138. See id. at 347-48.
139. See id. at 347.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 347-48.
142. See id. Professor Andrews noted that the earnings argument may not apply to
charitable giving from investment income but noted that the deduction is still justified for equity
reasons. See Andrews, supra note 19, at 371.
143. See id. at 352-53.
144. See id. at 352.
145. See id. at 353.
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allowing a charitable deduction to the taxpayer places the doctor and lawyer
in comparable positions.
Regardless of whether one accepts Professor Andrew's rationale for not
taxing imputed income, there is a persuasive case for allowing the deduction
to the lawyer. Creating an equal opportunity from a tax viewpoint for the
lawyer to engage in the same charitable acts as the doctor is a matter of equity.
It does not represent a subsidy or support for an activity but rather is an
equalization of tax positions. The tax lawyer is in the same position as the
doctor in that both wish to donate their time to the clinic that assists the poor.
However, the tax lawyer, who, unlike the doctor, does not have skills that are
particularly useful to the clinic, donates her time indirectly by performing
legal services for third parties and then donating the income generated by
those services to the clinic. The two taxpayers each are giving the clinic the
value of their services, but the tax lawyer can do so only by giving the clinic
the fruits of her labor. Therefore, it does not matter what the justification is
for not taxing the doctor on imputed income; placing the lawyer on equal
footing with the doctor implements a policy for equal treatment that conforms
to the notion of horizontal equity that surely is a basic and neutral principle of
tax policy. It also neutralizes the tax bias created by the tax system's failure
to tax the imputed income of the doctor and, as discussed in more detail in the
qualified residence interest discussion, a provision that attempts to equalize
a tax bias should not be considered nonneutral.
Professor Andrews noted that his illustration of transferring money to the
poor does not represent many of the types of donations for which a charitable
deduction is allowed.'46 Most charitable contributions go to churches,
schools, museums, etc., and only a portion of those amounts go to the poor.
However, Professor Andrews argued that the deduction is appropriate because
the one thing these types of organizations do have in common is that they all
produce "something in the nature of common or social goods or services.' 47
The donor is never the sole beneficiary of the services or goods provided by
the charitable organization.
2. The Kelman Response
Professor Kelman responded that the donor is a meaningful beneficiary
of her purported largesse because a donor typically obtains private benefits
from making gifts. 148 Kelman argued that the gift may provide the donor
privileges with respect to the donee, such as a voice in the selection of the
146. See id. at 356-57.
147. Id. at 357.
148. See Kelman, supra note 8.
2002]
Law Review
music to be played by a symphony, or the availability of good seats for a
performance that otherwise could not be obtained. Even if no benefit of that
type is obtained from the donee organization, Kelman noted that unless the
gift was anonymous, a charitable gift can enhance the donor's standing in the
community.'49 The considerations raised by Kelman illuminate the complex
nature of human behavior. They are proper factors to be taken into account
by legislators in determining whether, and to what extent, to allow a deduction
for charitable gifts. However, they do not demonstrate that the deduction
contravenes neutral tax policy. Allowing a deduction because of some of the
aspects of a charitable gift is consistent with neutral tax principles. Granted,
some other aspects of such gifts are not consistent with those principles. It is
for the legislature to determine whether the inconsistent aspects are relatively
minor and what influence they should have on the provision for a deduction.
To put this issue in focus, consider the tax law's treatment of comparable
occurrences in the context of business expenses. As previously discussed,
many business expenses both provide private benefits to the taxpayer and
serve business purposes. In determining whether to allow deductions for such
expenses, Congress should weigh a number of factors, such as the relative
importance of the expense to the conduct of the business, the potential for
abuse, the amount of the expense, and value of the taxpayer's private benefit.
In some cases, such as commuting expenses, Congress has decided to deny
any deduction. 5 ° In others, such as the transportation costs of travel to
attractive locations for a bona fide business reason, Congress has allowed a
deduction for the full amount.15' In still other cases, such as the cost of meals
partaken when traveling on business, Congress has compromised and allowed
a deduction for only part of the cost.' The personal and business elements
of such items are too interwoven to ignore either, and so their tax treatment
cannot properly be settled by taxonomic designations based on ignoring one
element and focusing exclusively on the other. If there is a significant
business element to an expense, that should be sufficient to remove the taint
of nonneutrality from any deduction that Congress enacts. In deciding
whether and to what extent a deduction is appropriate, Congress can weigh all
of the elements and considerations without the baggage of having the item
characterized as lacking neutrality.
149. See id. at 849 ("Even if the donor is indifferent whether any particular donee (or
charitable conduit or even social peer) responds to his gifts, his private feeling of satisfaction
depends on some general reciprocal relationship between his inner self and his society's
traditional recognition of the worthiness of giving.").
150. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2(e), 1.262-1(b)(5) (2001).
151. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2.
152. See I.R.C. § 274(n); see also supra note 105.
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3. Neutrality of the Deduction
The same considerations require that the charitable contribution deduction
be classified as neutral. If the public benefit of the gift is substantial, that
should be sufficient to satisfy any requirement of neutrality that might exist.
The extent to which the contribution provides a private benefit to the donor
is a factor to be weighed by Congress in determining whether the gift has the
requisite charitable purpose to qualify for a charitable deduction and whether
there is a sufficient degree of public benefit to justify allowing a deduction.
Therefore, the charitable deduction should not be listed as a tax
expenditure. This does not mean that a charitable deduction should be
continued. The legislature should weigh the competing considerations and
decide, as a matter of public policy, whether, and to what extent, a deduction
should be allowed.
As noted above, some commentators have argued against the charitable
deduction on account of minimal governmental oversight.'53 A case can be
made that the minimization of governmental oversight is actually a positive
aspect of the charitable deduction, since it minimizes the censorship power of
the government.'54  The question of whether or not the paucity of
governmental oversight with respect to the charitable deduction is good or bad
does not go to the tax expenditure concept. The charitable deduction fits
within the principles of the ideal tax system and should not be listed as a tax
expenditure, thereby subjecting it to the negative connotation that attends that
classification. The legislature should make its decision concerning the
deductibility of charitable gifts on the basis of the considerations discussed
above without being prejudiced against allowing the deduction by having it
characterized as contrary to neutral tax principles.
4. Implementing the Principles of Progressivity
In addition to the reasons advanced by Professor Andrews, there also is
a justification for the charitable deduction that rests on the principle of
progressive taxation. As noted previously, the progressive tax structure rests
on a premise that the allocation of the cost of government to the public should
impose relatively similar degrees of sacrifice on each person. Progressivity
153. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
154. For example, when the government supports something such as public television,
then the government has power to influence the views that are expressed. Many charities take
actions that are in opposition to positions held by the government. By making the deduction
mechanical, it tends to minimize, but not eliminate, the government's ability to influence the
charity.
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rests on an assumption that the marginal utility of income declines as the
amount of income increases. Utility of income represents the availability of
income for personal consumption by the taxpayer. To the extent that a
taxpayer donates funds to a broad public use, only an insignificant part of
which benefits the taxpayer, those funds are not used to consume goods or
services that are thereby lost to society. Consequently, the amount contributed
should not be counted in determining the income that is available for the
taxpayer's personal consumption. Only the remaining income is available
and, therefore, only the remaining income should be counted in determining
the appropriate tax burden on that taxpayer. The charitable deduction
accomplishes this. Admittedly, this is a variation of the argument that a
charitable contribution should not be considered consumption under the
definition of income, but if the tax system does not allow a deduction for the
expense, the utility that the taxpayer has with respect to the remaining dollars
will be distorted; thus, the principles of progressivity do support the
deduction.
Once again, note that the neutrality of the charitable deduction does not
constitute a factor supporting its retention. It merely precludes a bias against
retention that would exist if it were a nonneutral provision. The determination
of retention or repeal of the charitable deduction should rest exclusively on
policy considerations.
5. Deduction for Appreciated Property
The aforementioned analysis applies to charitable deductions of both cash
and property to the extent that the deductions do not exceed the donor's bases
in the property. In many circumstances, the Code provides a charitable
deduction for the fair market value of donated appreciated property.'55 In such
cases, the donor is allowed a deduction for the unrealized appreciation of the
property. The analysis herein does not support a deduction for the portion of
the deduction above the basis of the property. If one accepts the tax
expenditure concept, a deduction for the donation of unrealized appreciation
fits within that concept. Professor Andrews also admited that his arguments
do not support the deduction for unrealized appreciation:
The argument here is concerned only with adjusting gross income to make it a more
accurate measure of private consumption plus accumulation by allowing a deduction
to offset the inclusion in gross income of receipts that have been turned over to
155. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c) (2001); see also I.R.C. § 170(e)(1). In some cases,
only the amount of the taxpayer's basis in the donated appreciated property is deductible. See
I.R.C. § 170(e)(l). The ceiling on the amount that can be deducted is lower for gifts of
appreciated property than for other gifts. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(I)(C), (D).
[Vol. 1:1
Personal Deductions
philanthropic use. Since the effect of the fair market value rule is to allow a tax
deduction for an amount, the unrealized gain, that will never be included in gross
income, it clearly goes beyond that rationale. 1
56
Therefore, as noted by Professor Andrews, the deduction for unrealized
appreciation must be viewed "as a subsidy or artificial inducement, above and
beyond mere tax exemption, for philanthropic giving," i.e., a tax
expenditure." 7
D. Qualified Residence Interest
In general, no deduction is allowed to an individual for interest payments
if the underlying debt is not connected with a trade or business or an
investment.'58 There are a few exceptions to that general rule, the most
important exception being the itemized deduction allowed for qualified
residence interest.'59 In general, subject to a dollar ceiling, this provision
allows an itemized deduction for interest payable on a loan incurred in
connection with the acquisition of the taxpayer's principal residence and
another residence selected by the taxpayer, which loan is secured by the
residence. In addition, subject to a separate ceiling, the interest on certain
loans, other than acquisition indebtedness, that are secured by such residences
is deductible. 160  The Joint Committee on Taxation lists the deduction
allowable for interest on such loans as a tax expenditure.' 6'
The following scenarios illustrate the nature of the issue that the qualified
residence interest deduction presents. In studying these examples, assume,
contrary to current tax law, that no deduction is allowed for interest payable
on loans incurred to acquire a personal residence.
A house is for sale for $100,000. B, who wishes to purchase the house,
has $100,000 available which she can use either to invest or to purchase the
house. If she purchases the house, she will use it as her residence. Consider
the following two alternatives:
(1) B chooses to pay $100,000 cash for the house, and B occupies the
house as her residence. While living in the house, B enjoys the imputed
income from the "rent" that the house provides. That is, B enjoys the use of
156. Andrews, supra note 19, at 372.
157. Id.
158. See I.R.C. § 163(h) (1994).
159. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3). This is not a miscellaneous itemized deduction and thus is
not subject to the 2% floor. See I.R.C. § 67(b)(1). It is, however, subject to the overall
limitation imposed by I.R.C. § 68. But see supra note 81.
160. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C).
161. See JCT TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 14, at 18.
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the house, which is the "rent" provided by the value of the house, or by the
$100,000 that B invested in purchasing the house. The tax law does not tax
B on that imputed income. So, B derives the income from her $100,000,
consuming it by satisfying her need for shelter, and yet escapes taxation on
that income. There are several good reasons why Congress has not sought to
tax such imputed income, and the Tax Expenditure Budgets do not include
imputed income in their lists.
(2) Before making the decision to invest her $100,000 in the house, B
inquires as to the interest rate she would pay if she were to borrow $100,000
from the Friendly Bank, secure the loan by a mortgage on the house, and use
the borrowed funds to purchase the house. B discovers that she would pay 7%
annual interest for the loan. But, B knows that she can invest her $100,000 in
a safe investment and receive 10% interest on the investment. In the absence
of tax considerations, B would fare best if she were to borrow the $100,000
from the Friendly Bank, pay interest at 7%, and invest her funds at 10%. She
would be able to keep the 3% difference, or $3000, each year. However, B's
attorney informs her that the $10,000 interest she will earn on her investment
will be taxed at a 40% tax rate. As a result, while B will owe $7000 in annual
interest to the Friendly Bank, she will have only $6000 available from the
investment after taxes to pay the interest. If the interest payable to the Bank
is not deductible, B will have to pay $1000 out of her other resources to the
Friendly Bank. In light of the tax situation, B would be better advised to
invest her $100,000 in purchasing the house without taking out the loan from
the Bank. Even though she can earn more by investing her funds at 10% than
she would pay in interest on a loan, the use of the funds to purchase the house
turns out better for her because the tax law does not tax the imputed income
from the $100,000 that is invested in the home. The failure to tax the imputed
rent from the house creates an economic bias that distorts market choices. It
favors the buyer who pays with her own money over the buyer who pays with
borrowed funds. It also favors buying a residence, with or without borrowed
funds, over renting one.
If the interest payable to the Bank were deductible, as it is under current
tax law, and if B is not subject to the overall limitation of I.R.C. section 68, B
would do better to borrow the money to purchase the house and invest her
funds. If she can deduct the 7% interest she pays to the Bank, that will
effectively insulate 7% of the income she earns on her $100,000 investment
from taxation. The remaining 3%, or $3000, will be taxable at a 40% rate, but
B will then have $1800 left after payment of taxes. The allowance of a
deduction thus neutralizes the bias that the failure to tax imputed income
created, at least as between B's choice whether to use her own funds to
purchase the house or to borrow the funds. By neutralizing the tax
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consequences, B will make her decision on the basis of market considerations,
and that decision will result in the more efficient allocation of resources.
The function of the interest deduction allowed under section 163(h)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code can be viewed as a means of neutralizing the tax
bias that otherwise would distort the choice between B's borrowing funds or
using her own funds. It must be noted that the tax laws necessarily create
biases that distort many market choices, and it is not possible to eliminate or
neutralize them all. The most that can be done is to neutralize the bias that
otherwise would influence some specific choices, such as the choice whether
to borrow or to invest one's own funds. There must be some compelling
social or economic reason for Congress to wish that certain choices be made
free of a tax bias before Congress will eliminate that bias. In doing so,
Congress may very well create a new tax bias or aggravate one that already
exists. For example, the granting of the qualified residence interest deduction
aggravates the tax bias in favor of purchasing a residence rather than renting
one.
When the purpose of granting a deduction is to neutralize a tax bias
created by the operation of the tax system, should that deduction be classified
as a tax expenditure? On the one hand, Congress must have had a
programmatic purpose in choosing to eliminate the bias, and the use of a tax
deduction to further a programmatic goal seems to fall within the tax
expenditure concept. On the other hand, Congress is seeking to eliminate a
distortion that the tax law itself created, and that might seem more like a
correction of the unintended consequences of the tax system than the
subsidization of a program.
Although not the standard for a tax expenditure budget that is applied in
this article, Treasury's definition of a tax expenditure includes a provision
designed "to reduce certain tax-induced distortions." '162 Thus, from the point
of view of Treasury, the qualified residence interest deduction should be
classified as a tax expenditure, as Treasury has labeled it.'63
But the definition that Treasury employs is flawed. The thrust of the tax
expenditure concept is that Congress is using the tax system as a device to
spend money on some programmatic goal in the same manner that Congress
makes direct expenditures. While the purpose of such a neutralization
deduction is to promote some program, the need for that provision arises
because of the operation of the tax system itself. The correction of undesired
consequences of the tax system is a very different animal from a direct
162. OMB BUDGET 2001, supra note 33, at 107; see also OMB BUDGET 2002, supra
note 17. The 2002 budget does not set out the standards used but only states that previous
standards were applied. See id.
163. See OMB BUDGET 2002, supra note 17.
20021
Law Review
expenditure made to carry out a program. The label of "tax expenditure" is
unwarranted in this case.
However, the case for treating qualified residence interest as neutral is
weaker than the case for the other deductions discussed in this article. The
most likely reason that Congress granted this deduction was to further
encourage home ownership without any thought as to the extent that the
deduction eliminated a tax bias. This article contends that the fact that the
deduction eliminates a tax bias should be controlling, rather than focusing on
the subjective intent that Congress had. But the obvious importance in this
provision of encouraging home ownership makes the elimination of a tax bias
shrink in stature."
Note that the qualified residence interest deduction includes interest on
both acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness. 65 At first blush,
the justifications given for allowing a deduction for interest on acquisition
indebtedness would seem to be inapplicable to a deduction for interest on
home equity indebtedness. However there is a reasonable connection between
the two. Obtaining a home equity loan is akin to drawing money out of the
residence. Thus, to the extent that the amount of the loan does not exceed the
original purchase price of the house, less the outstanding balance of any
acquisition indebtedness, the home equity indebtedness can be seen as
comparable to a retroactive change of the amount used to purchase the house,
i.e., a retroactive increase in the amount invested elsewhere rather than used
to purchase the house. This merely indicates that there are reasonable grounds
for allowing the deduction, although concededly those grounds are more
164. Apart from neutralizing a tax bias, the principles underpinning progressivity lend
some support to classifying the qualified residence interest deduction as neutral. The
standardized tax rate schedule does not take into account the differences in cost of living in
various parts of the country. The cost of living, and therefore housing, in Topeka, Kansas is
much less than in San Francisco, California. Dave Anderson, in a conversation with the author,
suggested that the qualified residence deduction adjusts for that difference in cost, i.e., the
higher the loan, the greater the amount of interest and thus the qualified residence deduction.
Interview with David Anderson, Esq., Partner, Loeb & Loeb, LLP, in Los Angeles, Cal. (July
10, 2001). However, this contention that the deduction is supported by progressivity has less
strength than in the case of the other deductions described herein. One factor that lessens the
efficacy of this suggestion is that there is a dollar ceiling on the amount of a qualified loan.
Nevertheless, certainly there are instances in which the deduction will work as suggested by
Anderson, and therefore the contention does have merit.
165. Home equity indebtedness is a post-October 13, 1987 indebtedness, other than
acquisition indebtedness, that is secured by a qualified residence to the extent that the aggregate
amount of such indebtedness does not exceed the difference between the fair market value of
such qualified residence and the amount of the taxpayer's acquisition indebtedness with respect
to the residence. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C).
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tenuous than those supporting the deduction for interest on acquisition
indebtedness.
Again, it is important to emphasize that the exclusion of the interest
deduction from the list of tax expenditures does not make it sacrosanct.
Congress decides whether or not it is a desirable provision. The same
considerations that motivate the allowance of a deduction for interest on home
mortgages apply to interest on debts incurred for other consumer purchases,
but Congress chose to deny a deduction for such interest.'66
1. Itemization and the Standard Deduction
Some might argue that the thesis of this article is flawed based on the
assertion that the personal deductions addressed by this article do not promote
progressivity, since the deductions are itemized deductions and therefore are
not available to the large number of taxpayers who use the standard
deduction.'67 There are at least three independent reasons why that objection
is specious.
First, the standard deduction serves as a substitute for itemized deductions
by providing a standardized amount that reflects the total of the itemized
deductions that many taxpayers would have if they itemized. By allowing a
standardized amount as a deduction, Congress has relieved many taxpayers of
the burden of keeping track and retaining proof of those expenses that give
rise to itemized deductions. The standard deduction also eases both the
administrative burden of the taxpayer in filing a tax return and the burden of
the government in auditing it. If fewer expenses qualified as itemized
deductions, the dollar amount of the standard deduction likely would be
lowered. 6' As a result, the personal deductions discussed in this article
indirectly impact the tax rates applied to the income of taxpayers who use the
standard deduction by providing them with a higher amount of deduction.
166. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(1).
167. A taxpayer either can deduct her itemized deductions or take a standard deduction
of a specified dollar amount; the taxpayer cannot deduct both. See I.R.C. § 63(a), (b), (d)
(1994). Nonitemized deductions and the personal exemption can be deducted by a taxpayer
regardless of whether the taxpayer used the standard deduction. See I.R.C. §§ 62(a), 63(b)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999).
168. See I.R.C. § 63(f). In more recent years, the standard deduction may have been used
by Congress to provide a tax reduction that is targeted at lower-bracket taxpayers who typically
are the persons who use the standard deduction. For example, the additional standard deduction
that is allowed for aged or blind taxpayers will not benefit higher-bracket taxpayers who
typically itemize their deductions. This does not detract from the point that the basic standard
deduction reflects a kind of average amount of itemized deductions in the same general way that
the rate schedule reflects a kind of standardized utility curve.
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Second, the personal deductions which the author contends promote the
principles that underlie progressivity do not undercut the progressive rates as
they apply to those who use the standard deduction. Let us look at medical
expenses first, and then briefly examine the others.
Medical expenses that are reimbursed by an insurer and medical
premiums paid by an employer are excluded from a taxpayer's income. 69
That exclusion applies regardless of whether the taxpayer itemizes or uses the
standard deduction. So, the issue of the effect of having a standard deduction
applies only to the medical expense deduction under section 213. As a
consequence of the floor of 7.5% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income, the
medical expense deduction is allowed only for taxpayers who have
extraordinarily large expenses. Ordinary medical expenses are accommodated
in the rate schedule itself. If a lower bracket taxpayer has unusually large
medical expenses that nevertheless, together with her other deductions, are not
large enough to warrant itemizing, 70 those types of expenses are part of the
elements that are taken into account in determining the amount of the standard
deduction that Congress established, and so can be seen as accommodated in
the standard deduction.
The same reasoning applies to the casualty and theft loss deduction. Only
an extraordinarily large amount of loss-one that exceeds the 10% of adjusted
gross income floor-is deductible. If a lower bracket taxpayer has casualty and
theft losses in an amount that is sufficient to warrant itemizing, the taxpayer
will not use the standard deduction. If the losses and other deductions are not
great enough to warrant itemizing, they will be accommodated in the standard
deduction. Note that if a taxpayer who has personal casualty losses also has
personal casualty gains, the losses are treated as nonitemized deductions to the
extent they do not exceed the personal casualty gains,1 7' and are deductible by
taxpayers who use the standard deduction.
The identical considerations apply to the charitable contribution
deduction. If the charitable and other itemized deductions are not large
enough to justify itemizing, they will be accommodated in the standard
deduction, the amount of which is set to approximate such items.
Third, the objection that the personal deductions do not provide relief for
taxpayers who use the standard deduction is a complaint against the practice
of dividing deductions into itemized and nonitemized categories with limited
deductibility for the former. Even if that objection were otherwise viable, it
does not address the propriety of allowing a deduction for such items. Rather,
169. See I.R.C. §§ 104(a)(3), 105(b), 106.
170. Of course, if the expenses are large enough to warrant itemizing, the taxpayer will
not elect to use the standard deduction.
171. See I.R.C. § 165(h)(4)(A).
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it addresses the question of whether the difference in treatment accorded to
itemized and nonitemized deductions contravenes the policies that underlie the
principle of progressivity.
Take the example of the deduction allowed for employee business
expenses that are not reimbursed by the employer. Most unreimbursed
business expenses of an employee are treated as miscellaneous itemized
deductions. 72 These are not personal deductions; they are part of the cost of
the employee's production of income and so properly reduce taxable income
to the extent that they are permitted to be deducted. Yet many employees
cannot take deductions for these expenses because they use the standard
deduction, and because of the 2% of adjusted gross income floor. That
discontinuity does not demonstrate that the employee business expenses that
are deducted have no positive role in the progressive rate system. What it
does suggest is that the limitations on the deductibility of such expenses are
unwise.
In the case of personal deductions, there may or may not be adequate
grounds to limit their use to those who itemize, but that issue has no bearing
on the question of whether the personal deductions that are allowed promote
the principles of progressivity.
CONCLUSION
It has been some years since the issue of medical and charitable
deductions has been addressed by Professors Andrews and Kelman. This
article has tried to respond to some of the criticisms that Kelman raised to the
arguments set forth by Andrews and to contend that Kelman's arguments do
not reach the question of the tax neutrality of those provisions. In addition,
while not disparaging Professor Andrews' arguments, this article has set forth
a new and independent justification for the two deductions. Moreover, this
article has explored justifications for two other personal deductions: the
qualified residence interest deduction and the casualty and theft loss
deduction.
The new and independent justification that the author proposes for
characterizing personal deductions as tax neutral provisions is grounded on
the premise that progressivity is an integral part of the tax system and that the
graduated tax rate structure, which is the means used to implement
progressivity, is designed to reflect the declining utility that dollars of income
have as the amount of taxpayer's income increases. As income increases, the
utility of additional dollars of income decreases, and therefore taking a larger
172. See DOUGLAS A. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 229-30 (4th ed. 1999); see also
I.R.C. § 67(b).
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percentage of that additional income as a tax equalizes the sacrifice or burden
imposed on taxpayers having disparate amounts of income. The tax rate
schedule constitutes a standardized and crude utility curve for the average
taxpayer. Certain events, such as illness or theft, alter the utility curve for
those taxpayers that experience them, making the standardized tax rate
schedule grossly inappropriate when applied to them. If such events involve
large enough dollar amounts and occur in the life of a community frequently
enough to warrant addressing, the tax rate schedule that is applied to those
persons for the year in which the event occurs should be modified to more
accurately reflect the utility of their income to them. The medical expense,
charitable contribution and casualty and theft loss deductions serve that
function. Since those deductions implement the principles on which the
progressive income tax system rests, they are not nonneutral and are not tax
expenditures. The question of whether such provisions should be retained or
repealed turns on value judgments and policy issues and should not be
influenced by characterizations of their neutrality or nonneutrality in an ideal
income tax system.
The 2002 budget makes it clear that the Bush Administration is
skeptical of the tax expenditure concept. '73 While the author has not explicitly
taken a position as to whether the tax expenditure concept is valid, there is a
subtext to this article suggesting that the concept is unworkable and
misleading. A consequence of showing that many personal deductions, which
currently are listed as tax expenditures, can be seen as complying with neutral
tax principles is that the selection of items to be included in a list of tax
expenditures has a considerable degree of arbitrariness. The inclusion or
exclusion of items appears to depend more on the political views of the parties
making the selection than on objective criteria. As Bruce Bartlett notes:
"Were the tax expenditures budget nothing but an analytical tool, it might be
unobjectionable, despite its shortcomings. But it is far more than that. It
institutionalizes, in a very powerful way, a particular view of tax policy that
makes it exceedingly difficult to make positive reforms."' 74
Nevertheless, it is useful to have available estimates of the amount of
additional revenue the government would receive if a specific provision were
removed from the Code. While the estimates in the tax expenditure budgets
are crude in that they fail to account for changes in taxpayer behavior that the
repeal of the provision would engender,'75 even such crude estimates are
useful. When Congress considers whether to make changes in the tax law, it
173. See OMB BUDGET 2002, supra note 17, at 61; see also supra note 33.
174. Bartlett, supra note 27, at 420.
175. See id. at 418 (explaining several deficiencies in how the tax expenditure budget
calculates its estimates).
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needs to have some idea as to the effect that such changes will have on
revenue collection. As the author has noted, decisions to retain or repeal a tax
provision should rest solely on policy considerations, and revenue collection
is obviously one such consideration. The objection to the tax expenditure
budget is not that it makes such estimates or even that the estimates are
inaccurate. Rather, those who object to the tax expenditure concept do so
because it characterizes certain selected provisions as nonneutral and thereby
especially suspect. The bases on which items are included in or excluded
from tax expenditure budgets are themselves suspect. A question then
remains whether the usefulness of having such revenue estimates is more than
offset by the negative characterizations that are improperly accorded to many
provisions.
